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NEW YORK DEBATES COMMERCIAL RENT
CONTROL: DESIGNER ICE CREAM STORES
VERSUS THE CORNER GROCER
I.

Introduction

In the mid-1970's as the City of New York teetered on the brink
of bankruptcy, the prospects and predictions for the future of the
city were grim. The country, and New York State itself, questioned
the city's ability to recover.' Despite deep cuts in staffing and
services, however, New York City survived this crisis with such
remarkable resilience that today it is touted as one of the most
successful comebacks in the past ten years. 2
Notwithstanding New York City's current economic renaissance, 3
4
not all New Yorkers have benefitted from the revitalized economy.

1. See Gottlieb, New York's Rescue: The Offstage Dramas, N.Y. Times, July
2, 1985, at Al, col. 1 (review of fiscal crisis New York City experienced in mid1970's and difficulties New York faced in convincing federal government and institutional lenders to aid it in overcoming budgetary shortfalls).
2. See Oreskes, Proxmire Calls City's Recovery A Fiscal Model, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 20, 1985, at B4, col. 3 (Senator William Proxmire, "New York City's chief
nemesis on Capitol Hill during the fiscal crisis of the 70's," declares that New York

City's recovery should serve as model for federal government in area of fiscal discipline);
Gottlieb, The New York Recovery: Can It Be Sustained?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1985,
§ 12, at 12, col. 1 (report released by New York Regional Economists Society concluded
that " 'the turnaround that New York City has undergone since 1977 can be classified
as nothing short of phenomenal' ").
3. See Metropolis 1985: A Look At New York's Economic Future, 5 MANHATTAN
REPORT

2 (No. 4 1985).

4. "Liberal critics point out that a large and growing underclass has been shut
off from the benefits of growth. Conservative critics attack high taxes and excessive
regulations that perpetuate an oversized public sector and threaten the city's longterm economic health." Id. In assessing the effects of the nationwide economic recovery
during the 1980's, Samuel M. Ehrenhalt, Regional Commissioner of the Federal Bureau
of Labor Statistics in New York, stressed that the situation in New York demonstrated
how recovery has bypassed many people. " 'New York City has done very well in
the last few years ... but there are apparently limits to the payoff we can expect
from economic growth. Only 51 percent of the city's working-age population is
employed, as against a national figure of 61 percent.' " Pear, Millions Bypassed As
Economy Soars, N.Y. .Times, Mar. 16, 1986, at Al, col. 1; see also Schanberg, The
Poverty Divide, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1985, at A25, col. 1 (as New York City booms
economically, more people are hungry and homeless in the city than at any time since
Depression); How Many Will Share New York's Prosperity?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20,
1985, § 4, at 6, col. 1 (symposium on New York City as economically divided city).
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In particular, small business retailers, manufacturers, and profes-

sionals have asserted that rapidly increasing rents are threatening
both their existence and the economic vitality of the city. Tenants
running small businesses are clamoring for relief in the form of
rent control and rent stabilization programs.'

Owners of small

businesses maintain that large, uncontrolled increases in rents are
forcing them into untenable financial positions. They envision a
scenario of unregulated increases in commercial rents that will force
many businesses to close their doors, depriving the neighborhood
of the goods and services that sustain the economic vitality of a
6
residential area.

In an effort to avoid this result and to mitigate the alleged
unreasonableness of commercial rent increases, a number of city

and state legislators have proposed legislation to limit commercial
rent increases.' To date, neither the state nor the city has enacted
a law that regulates increases of rent on commercial leases.
Opponents of proposed commercial rent regulation have pointed
to various indicia, including high tenant turnover rates and increased
tax revenues from areas experiencing economic revitalization, as
evidence of an expanding, healthy economy and commercial real

5. See Small Business Commission Public Hearing, (Jan. 24, 1986) (statement of
New York City Councilwoman Ruth Messinger) [hereinafter Messinger Statement].
For examples of small businessmen who claim that they need commercial rent regulation
to remain in business and to continue providing essential services, see Lewis, High
Rents Squeeze Mom & Pop Citywide, N.Y. Daily News, Sept. 23, 1984, at 1, col. 1
(flood of 15,000 petitions, post cards and letters from shopkeepers and community
leaders in Bronx calling for commercial rent protection inundated offices of Mayor
of New York and City Council). See McCain, Store Rents Skyrocket in a Changing
New York City, Boston Globe, May 19, 1985, at A17, col. 2; Schanberg, Let Them
Eat Boutiques, N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1984, at A25, col. 1 (critical look at replacement

of stores providing essential goods and services in West Village of Manhattan by

"shops that sell gourmet ice cream, upscale fashions and designer cookies"); see also
Carmody, West Side Beauty Salon Loses to Gentrification, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27,

1985, at B1, col. 1 [hereinafter Carmody]; Gilgoff, Neighborhood Minus Its Markets,
N.Y. Newsday (undated) (after closing of two supermarkets, residents and shopkeepers
in Flatbush, Queens, neighborhood express concern over loss of services and consumer

traffic that supported other area stores) (available at Fordham Urban Law Journal
office); Fulman, "Lost Our Lease" Hits Home For 2, N.Y. Daily News (undated)

(two businesses that served neighborhoods for 33 and 40 years plan to close because
of unaffordable rent increases) (available at Fordham Urban Law Journal office).
6. Wedemeyer, Debate on Retail Rent Control Crackles, N.Y. Times, Mar.18,

1984, § 8, at 7, cols. 2-3 [hereinafter Wedemeyer]; see Messinger Statement, supra
note 5, at 1.
7. See infra notes 72-151 and accompanying text.
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estate market in New York City.' The underpinning of their position
is that any governmental interference in the free market determination of commercial rents would seriously impinge upon the city's
long-term economic growth. 9 Accordingly, opponents of commercial
rent regulation vigorously oppose enacting commercial rent regulation statutes.
Compounding the issue is the paucity of empirical data to support
either position in the debate, which is fueled by strong emotion' °
and self interest on both sides. In addition, both sides have charged
that their adversaries have unfairly or inaccurately presented the
nature of available data.'

8. See NEw YORK DEP'T OF CITY PLANNING, PRIVATE REnvEsTmENT & NEIGH123 (Oct. 1985) (study of two areas undergoing economic revitalization concluded that service levels in these areas, measured by per capita establishment
figures, exceeded citywide levels in almost all categories) [hereinafter PRIVATE REINVESTMENT]; Testimony on Commercial Rent Control Before the City Council on
Economic Development 4 (Feb. 28, 1984) (statement of The Real Estate Board of
New York, Inc.). Testimony given before the New York City Council on Economic
Development referred to statistics for the period between 1977-1982, which showed
that the city's real property tax bill for an area of the Upper West Side of Manhattanthe stretch of Columbus Avenue between 63rd and 86th Streets that experienced
economic revitalization-increased from $2,319,000 to $3,824,400. See id. The testimony
asserted that the additional $1,505,400 in revenues paid for extensive police protection
and sanitation services. See id.
9. See Statement of the New York Chamber of Commerce and Industry and
The New York City Partnership, Inc. Presented Before The Small Retail Business
Study Commission 2-6 (Jan. 24, 1986) (statement by Edward S. Cabot, President of
New York Chamber of Commerce and Industry and Executive Vice President of The
New York City Partnership, Inc.) (outline of economic dangers inherent in commercial
rent control schemes); Testimony on Commercial Rent Control Before The City Council
on Economic Development 3 (June 27, 1985) (statement of The Real Estate Board
of New York, Inc. by Arthur Margon, its Senior Vice President).
10. The level of emotion surrounding the issue was pointedly demonstrated by an
incident involving the Mayor of New York's bestselling book entitled "Mayor." John
Scioli, a bookstore proprietor who paid $1,300 a month in rent for his store in
Brooklyn Heights and faced a tripling of the rent, expressed his outrage at Mayor
Koch's opposition to commercial rent control by tripling the advertised price on
"Mayor" to $53.85. "Mr. Scioli said the book sold well at the list price of $17.95.
It isn't selling at all at the new price." Anderson & Prial, Triple Whammy, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 24, 1984, at 27, col. 2.
11. City Council Hearing on Commercial Rent Control-(June 27, 1985) (testimony
by Alan Altschuler, Dean of Graduate School of Public Administration at New York
University and Chairman of the Small Retail Business Study Commission). Altschuler
stated:
As for the problem itself, it turns out that virtually all that is known is
anecdotal. It is clear that many small retailers have been forced to move
by rent increases when their leases ran out, and that some streets have
come to be dominated by establishments serving people who are not resident
BORHOOD CHANGE
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Edward Koch, the Mayor of New York City, has categorically

stated that he does not favor commercial rent control. 2 Despite
this position, however, in May, 1985 the Mayor, in conjunction
with the New York City Council, created the Small Business Retail

Study Commission (Commission) to evaluate the impact of rising
rents on businesses, city residents, and neighborhoods. 3 The fruit
of the Commission's labor was a report released in June, 1986,
14
detailing its findings and policy recommendations.
This Note will review the history of commercial rent regulation
in New York City 5 and examine existing commercial rent regulation
proposals, both in terms of their underlying goals and their methods

in the immediate neighborhood. But no one has data on whether retail
business turnover citywide has substantially increased in recent years. Nor
is it clear what the consequences have been for consumers, or for the city
tax base, or for the attractiveness of neighborhoods as perceived by residents.
Id.

Recognizing that "the absence of credible small area data on retail businesses,
commercial property owners, and shoppers in New York City neighborhoods mitigated
against performing a comprehensive policy appraisal," the Small Retail Business Study
Commission undertook extensive research to be incorporated in its final report. SMALL
RETAIL BUSINESS STUDY COMMISSION: INTERIM REPORT UPON COMPLETION OF PHASE I-

1 to 1-2 (Feb. 1986) (opening letter of Commission Chairman Alan Altschuler to
Mayor Edward Koch) [hereinafter INTErim REPORT]. The Commission retained Lou
Harris and Associates, a survey research firm, to conduct surveys of retail merchants
and local shoppers in twelve selected New York City neighborhoods. See id. The
surveys were designed to identify conditions and changes affecting small retail businesses
in the targeted commercial districts, and to document the impact of any such conditions

and changes on local residents who depend on neighborhood businesses for essential
goods and services. See id. at 1-3 to 1-4. In addition, the Commission oversaw a
citywide survey administered and correlated with neighborhood merchant surveys. See
id. Neighborhood shopper surveys were "cross-tabulated with citywide statistical sources
to create a profile representative of shoppers in the City as a whole." Id. at IV-4.
For a detailed discussion of the methodology and research design, see id. at 1-1 to
1-3, IV-4 to IV-18.
12. The Mayor stated:
I believe, as I have stated in the past, that one of the solutions proposed
for these problems-commercial rent control-is unwise and would be
counterproductive. In my judgment, it would create far more problems that
(sic) it would solve, and while some individual merchants or businesses
might benefit in the short run, such a law would seriously impede the
growth and vitality of the city's economy and in the long run result in
the loss of both jobs and services.
Statement by Mayor Edward I. Koch 1 (May 7, 1985) (available at Fordham Urban
Law Journal office).
13. Id.
14. SMALL BusNEss RETAIL STUDY CoMMzssIoN: 'FnAL REPORT I-1 (June, 1986)

[hereinafter FnAL

REPORT].

15. See infra notes 19-69 and accompanying text.
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of operation. 16 The Note will argue that, as a matter of general
economic and public policy, the legislature should not enact commercial rent regulations.' 7 In light of these policy considerations,
the Note will then examine specific conclusions of the Commission
in its Final Report and its assessment of proposed strategies to
deal with the problem related to the escalation of commercial rents' 8
for small businesses and neighborhood consumers in New York
City.
II.

Origins and History of Commercial Rent Control in New
York

The concept of commercial rent control is hardly new, dating
back to the post-World War II period when New York instituted
a program to control rent increases on commercial premises. Legislators kept the controls in place for about eighteen years, however,
in response to mounting pressure from landlords and warnings from
the judiciary in opinions challenging the relevant statutes, the legislature ultimately engaged in a program of gradual decontrol.
A.

The Need for Commercial Rent Control

The exigencies of the Second World War greatly effected the
commercial rental sector in urban areas. During the War the Federal
Government occupied over 5,000,000 square feet of commercial
space in New York City.' 9 In addition, the War effort suspended
the construction of new buildings.2 0 This alteration of the real estate
market resulted in a shortage of commercial real estate, exorbitant
rent increases and, ultimately, many evictions. 2'
In 1944, the New York State Legislature authorized a special
committee to investigate the situation. 2 2 The Committee, citing the
nexus among the shortage of commercial real estate, increased rents

16. See infra notes 70-151 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 152-201 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 202-303 and accompanying text.
19. Meringolo, Rent Control: What Remains and Its Future, 22
Rv. 207, 208 (1955-56) [hereinafter Meringolo].

BRooKLYN

L.

20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id.; see also Keating, The Elmwood Experiment: The Use of Commercial
Rent Stabilization To Preserve A Diverse Neighborhood Shopping District, 28 WASH.
U.J. URBa. & Cornm,. L. 107, 125 (1985) [hereinafter Keating].
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and the deleterious effect 23 of an unregulated commercial rental
sector, concluded that commercial rent control was necessary to
avert business stoppages and migrations, which in turn would cause
widespread unemployment and a decline in the production of war
goods and essential civilian commodities .24

B.

The 1945 Statutes
Legislators drafted a bill to remedy the situation in the commercial

rental sector. Invoking its police powers 25 in the face of the declared
state of emergency,2 6 the New York State Legislature in 1945 passed
two laws to control rents on commercial leases: the Emergency
Commercial Space Rent Control Law"7 (ECSRCL) and the Emergency
Business Space Rent Control Law 28 (EBSRCL). The two laws were
virtually identical. 29 The Legislature modeled the laws after the World
War II federal residential rent control law and the original 1920
New York State residential rent control law.30

23. The New York Temporary State Commission (Temporary Commission) held
about 175 private hearings obtaining testimony and written data from over 800 witnesses.
See Meringolo, supra note 19, at 208-09. In one public hearing in New York on
October 5, 1944, 230 persons appeared on behalf of tenants, landlords, trade associations, civic organizations, labor groups and other individuals and groups. See id.
Forty-one persons gave testimony and statements on behalf of a trade association and
a real estate management concern. See id. In addition to local hearings and studies,
the Temporary Commission examined conditions in other states and consulted federal
officials. See id. Information was gathered through attendance at hearings conducted
by the U.S. Senate Special Committee to Study Problems of American Small Business
and by conferring with officials of the Office of Price Administration. See Meringolo,
supra note 19, at 208-09.
As a result of its investigations, the Temporary Commission reported that a state
of public emergency existed on March 1, 1943, and continued to exist because of
excessive rents exacted by landlords due to the shortage of commercial space created
by the War and the resulting disparity in bargaining powers between landlords and
commercial tenants. See id. at 209-10.
24. See id. at 211-12.
25. "This legislation declared that the health, morals, safety and general welfare
of the people was involved." Id. at 212.
26. Id.; see also Keating, supra note 22, at 125.
27. See Emergency Commercial Space Rent Control Law, N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW
§§ 8521-8538 (Consol. 1945) (expired Dec. 31, 1963) [hereinafter ECSRCL]. The
ECSRCL applied to commercial space other than stores and offices. See id.
28. See Emergency Business Space Rent Control Law, N.Y. UNcoNsoL. LAW §§
8551-8567 (Consol. 1945) (expired Dec. 31, 1963) [hereinafter EBSRCLJ. The EBSRCL
governed stores and offices. See id.

29. See Keating, supra note 22, at 125' n.66.
30. See id. at 125-26.
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Unlike some of the proposals now under consideration for New

York City, which apply only to small commercial tenants, 3 these

commercial rent control statutes regulated the rents of both small
and large commercial tenants alike. 32 The statutory framework
permitted the legislature to control rent increases and made available

judicial review of these increases on a case-by-case basis.33 In no
case, however, did the statutes permit the court to award rent

increases beyond the legislatively mandated ceiling rate.3 4 Finally,
these schemes proscribed the eviction of commercial tenants without

"just cause." 35

31. See infra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
32. See Keating, supra note 22, at 126.
33. The base rents were those rents in effect on Mar. 1, 1943, for commercial
space and on June 1, 1944, for business space. See ECSRCL, supra note 27,
§ 8522(e); EBSRCL, supra note 28, § 8552(c). In addition, landlords were permitted
to add fifteen percent to these base rents to adjust for the "rollback" period. See
id.; ECSRCL, supra note 27, § 8522(e).
The laws recognized the landlord's right to a reasonable return, see id. § 8524;
EBSRCL, supra note 28, § 8554, and if a landlord believed he deserved more than
the statutorily-fixed eight percent increase upon fair value of his property (statute
presumed fair value was latest assessed value), he was free to petition the New York
Supreme Court and to present other evidence on the fair value of his property. See
ECSRCL, supra note 27, § 8524(1); EBSRCL, supra note 28, § 8554(1).
Contrary to the federal residential rent control program, under which landlords
applied to the rent commission (an administrative agency) for rent increases greater
than the statutorily fixed amount, the New York Legislature vested the authority to
grant such increases in the courts. -See Meringolo, supra note 19, at 212-13. This
decision rested largely on New York's successful experience in allowing the courts to
administer the 1920 housing rent laws. See id. "Borrowing a page from the precedent
and experience gained from the application of those laws, which had proved effective
and accomplished the objects sought, the Legislature vested the administration of the
enactments in the courts." See id. at 213.
34. Fair return increases could not exceed 15 percent annually. See ECSRCL, supra
note 27, § 8524(2); EBSRCL, supra note 28, § 8554(2).
Commercial properties exempted from control included the following: (1) specified
businesses (for example, places of public assembly, property with port-related uses,
and temporary parking lots), see Keating, supra note 22, at 126; (2) leases with less
than four-month terms, see id.; (3) condemned property, see id.; (4) new construction
(added by a 1946 amendment), see id. at 126 & n.71; (5) vacated space (added by
a 1950 amendment), see id. at 126 & n.72; (6) leases with variable rents tied to sales
volume and graduated rents (upon expiration, rents under new leases were required
to be set by arbitration or on the basis of comparable rents), see id. at 126 & n.73;
and (7) leases in effect since June 1, 1939 (provided that rent did not exceed allowable
ceiling), see id. at 126 & n.74.
35. The statutes prohibited the eviction of commercial tenants except for enumerated
causes. See ECSRCL, supra note 27, § 8528; EBSRCL, supra note 28,
§ 8558.
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C. Expiration, Renewal, and Erosion of Commercial Rent
Control
Although the legislature originally envisioned that the 1945 laws
would expire in 1946, it reenacted them repeatedly until 1963,
when it finally allowed the laws to expire. 36 Throughout this period, the legislature embarked upon a program of gradual decontrol by amending the laws generally in accordance with the

recommendations of the New York Temporary State Commission,
which was created in 1948 to study the rental sector.17 Thus, what

was originally a relatively strict system of commercial rent control
was effectively weakened by the legislature's amendments. 31 In 1963,
after a series of unsuccessful court challenges by landlords, the
legislature allowed the two commercial rent control laws to expire.3 9

36. See Keating, supra note 22, at 127-28.
37. See id. at 127-28.
38. Pursuant to the 1946 reenactment, newly-constructed commercial space was
exempted. See ECSRCL, supra note 27, § 8535; EBSRCL, supra note 28, § 8564. In
1949, the legislature amended the laws to allow landlords to evict store tenants who
failed to meet the terms of "matching" leases offered to prospective replacement
tenants. See Keating, supra note 22, at 128-29. Landlords could evict tenants who did
not match a noncancellable lease at an annual rent of $7,500 for a term of ten years
or more. See id. By 1960 the legislature reduced the threshold annual rent to $2,500.
ECSRCL, supra note 27, § 8528(k); EBSRCL, supra note 28, § 8558(k); see also
Keating, supra note 22, at 128-29.
In 1950, the legislature allowed vacated units to be decontrolled. See ECSRCL,
supra note 28, § 8533; EBSRCL, supra note 29, § 8562. Although these amendments
spelled the eventual demise of commercial rent control, landlords were not satisfied
because "misfit" tenants, tenants who refused to vacate unless landlords bought out
their leases at a premium, threatened to obstruct the process of decontrol. See Keating,
supra note 22, at 128. Another 1950 amendment aimed at preventing tenant windfalls
and decontrol obstruction allowed landlords to require tenants subletting 20% or more
of their space to pay to the landlord the net rent that they received from the subtenant.
See ECSRCL, supra note 27, § 8524(4); EBSRCL, supra note 28, § 8554(4); see also
Keating, supra note 22, at 129.
Sustained pressure from landlords persuaded the legislature to once again weaken
the commercial rent control laws. See Keating, supra note 22, at 129. In 1952, the
legislature added a space consolidation amendment which allowed landlords to evict
store tenants without making a matching offer when the landlord intended to combine
spaces into a single unit renting for $10,000 or more annually. See ECSRCL, supra
note 27, § 8528(kk); EBSRCL, supra note 28, § 8558(kk); see also Keating, supra note
22, at 129.
39. See infra notes 40-67 and accompanying text.
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D. Constitutional Challenges to New York's Commercial Rent
Control Laws
Immediately after the commercial rent control laws became effective, 40 litigants challenged their constitutionality. 4 1 No litigant,
however, was ever successful in striking down the statutes.4 2 Although the scope of their holdings is narrow, these cases are illustrative of the types of challenges that any commercial rent
regulation system may expect to face. These cases are therefore
of special significance to jurisdictions contemplating, 4 or currently
subject to," commercial rent regulation.
Although landlords mounted numerous challenges against New
York's commercial rent control laws, a few leading cases are particularly important in terms of the grounds on which the statutes
were challenged and the courts' reasoning in upholding the statutes.
1. Twentieth Century Associates, Inc. v. Waldman
The first constitutional challenge to the ECSRCL was Twentieth
Century Associates, Inc. v. Waldman. 45 In Twentieth Century Associates, a landlord challenged the statute on the grounds that it

40. The ECSRCL was passed and became effective on January 24, 1945. The
EBSRCL was passed and became effective on March 28, 1945.
41. See infra notes 45-63 and accompanying text.

42. See id.
43. Several major cities have considered commercial rent control: (1) New York
City, see infra notes 70-151 and accompanying text; (2) San Francisco, see Keating,
supra note 22, at 153; Telephone interview with San Francisco Supervisor W. Britt
(Feb. 15, 1986) (recent hearings on need for commercial rent control in San Francisco
proved inconclusive); and (3) Los Angeles, see Letter from D.H. Ford, City of

Los Angeles Community Dev. Dep't Rent Stabilization Division to the Governmental
Operations Committee on Commercial Tenant Protection (Nov. 18, 1983) (discussing

status of commercial rent control in Los Angeles) (available in Fordham Urban
Law Journal office).
44. Berkeley, California, is the only city in the United States that currently

regulates commercial rents. See Keating, supra note 22, at 136.
45. 294 N.Y. 571, 63 N.E.2d 177 (1945), appeal dismissed, 326 U.S. 696 (1946)
(landlord, who had executed lease prior to effective date of New York ECSRCL
providing for rent increase in excess of emergency rent ceiling sued to recover
entire amount of rent stipulated in signed lease). In Court Square Bldg., Inc. v.
City of New York, 298 N.Y. 380, 83 N.E.2d 843, cert. denied, 337 U.S. 916
(1949), a similar challenge to the EBSRCL, the New York Court of Appeals
summarily upheld the validity of the law relying on the rationale of the court in
Twentieth Century Assocs., 298 N.Y. at 385, 83 N.E.2d at 845.
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violated the contracts clause, 46 the due process clause, 47 and the
equal protection clause 48 of the United States Constitution. Deferring to the legislative determination that a public emergency existed
in the commercial rental sector, the New York Court of Appeals
based its decision on two distinct constitutional precepts: (1) the
state's police power embraces the authority to impair existing leases
when a public emergency arises; and (2) the ECSRCL was a rational
and valid exercise of the police powers by the legislature in response
to the public emergency in the commercial rental sector. 49 Thus,
the first constitutional challenge to the legislation failed.
2.

Finn v. 415 Fifth Avenue Co.

The second major decision defining the constitutional parameters
of the state's power to control commercial rents was Finn v. 415
Fifth Avenue Co. 50 In Finn, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the ECSRCL

46. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. "No State shall ... pass any ... Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts." Id.
47. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. "No State shall ... deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Id.
48. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. "No State shall . . . deny to any person

within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id.
49. See Twentieth Century Associates, 294 N.Y. 571, 580, 63 N.E.2d 177, 179

(1945).
At the close of the last war a similar emergency arose in connection
with housing conditions in New York City and a group of statutes were
enacted to meet the crisis (L. 1920, chs. 136, 942-953). The validity of
these laws was considered by this court and by the Supreme Court of
the United States and they were sustained as validly enacted in the
exercise of the police powers of the State, notwithstanding "the impairment of the obligation of the contract of the lessees to surrender
possession" of the leased premises ....
The principle is firmly established today that all contracts are subject to
the police power of the State, and, when emergency arises and the public
welfare requires modification of private contractual obligations in the
public interest, the question is not whether "legislative action affects
contracts incidentally, or directly or indirectly, but whether the legislation

is addressed to a legitimate end and the measures taken are reasonable
and appropriate to that end . ..

."

In light of the emergency which called into play the police powers of
the State in this case, we are unable to say that the measures taken in
the public interest were unreasonable or inappropriate to curb the evils
arising from the emergency and to accomplish the public purposes declared
in the statute.
Id.
50. 153 F.2d 501 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 839 (1946).
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over a landlord's claim that the statute constituted a taking of
property without due process of law in violation of the fourteenth

amendment.

1

In so holding, the court, in an opinion by Judge

Learned Hand, cited the New York Court of Appeals' decision in
Twentieth Century Associates and the precedent the court relied

upon in that case.
challenge.
3.

2

Once again, the law withstood a constitutional

Subsequent Challenges

Landlords persisted in challenging the constitutionality of the enactments each time the legislature renewed them. After the reenactment of the EBSRCL in 1955, a landlord challenged the

constitutionality of the statute by arguing that the emergency that
had originally legitimized the law as an exercise of the state police
powers no longer existed. 3 Despite evidence 54 adduced by the land-

lord of a substantial increase in new office building space and an
increased vacancy rate, 5 the New York Court of Appeals concluded

that a rational basis existed for the legislative finding of an emer-

6
gency that justified the renewal of rent controls on business space.
Thus, the court left open the possibility of a successful challenge
to the statute on the same grounds as this appeal under circumstances
in which a finding of an emergency would lack a rational basis.17

51. See Finn, 153 F.2d at 503-504.

52. See id. at 504.
53. Lincoln Bldg. Assocs. v. Barr, 1 Misc. 2d 560, 149 N.Y.S.2d 460 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1956), aff'd, 1 N.Y.2d 413, 135 N.E.2d 801, 153 N.Y.S.2d 633,

appeal dismissed, 355 U.S. 12 (1957).
54. Barr, 1 N.Y.2d at 419, 135 N.E.2d at 805, 153 N.Y.S.2d at 638 ("[tlhe
evidence below followed the general pattern of that presented to the temporary
commission at its afore-mentioned 1955 hearing preliminary to the re-enactment in
question").

55. See id. at 418, 135 N.E.2d at 804, 153 N.Y.S.2d at 637.
56. Id.at 419, 135 N.E.2d at 805, 153 N.Y.S.2d at 639.
At most, then, landlord representatives by their own evidence at both

this trial and before the legislative commission did no more than raise
a conflict of testimony and opinion-a debatable question as to the
existence of an emergency and the need for rent control as to office
space. But the resolution of that question was properly for the legislature,
and no court may substitute therefor its own evaluation of the weight
of such conflicting proof .... Here ... there is a rational basis for the

legislative finding.
Id. at 419-20, 135 N.E.2d at 805-06, 153 N.Y.S.2d at 639.
57. See id. at 420, 135 N.E.2d at 806, 153 N.Y.S.2d at 639 ("[wjhether and
for how long the Legislature may lawfully continue office rent control must, and
shall, be a question open for future review").
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The 1959 reenactment of the two laws prompted the same landlord to challenge the EBSRCL on a similar theory." The trial
court upheld the EBSRCL, and once again the New York Court
of Appeals affirmed the decision. 9 The court found that the landlord had failed to carry his burden of proof 60 and that a rational
basis for the statute still existed. 61 Although the majority claimed
to uphold the controls on the ground that an emergency continued
to exist, the opinion revealed that the court may have been more
convinced of the need to remove the controls gradually than of
the existence of any emergency. 62 Both the majority and one dissenting justice recognized that the economic situation in 1959 was
quite dissimilar to that in 1945. Justice Burke, however, differed
sharply from the majority over how this reality related to the ques63
tion of the constitutionality of the statute.
The legislature allowed both commercial rent control laws to
expire in 1963. 64 Although the laws had withstood constitutional
challenges, the influence of active landlord lobbying, the Temporary
Committee's position against reenactment, 65 and warnings in judicial
opinions against exercising police powers in the absence of a bona

58. See Lincoln Bldg. Assocs. v. Jame, 8 N.Y.2d 179, 168 N.E.2d 528, 203
N.Y.S.2d 86 (1960).
59. See id. at 182, 168 N.E.2d at 530, 203 N.Y.S.2d at 88.
60. See id. at 181, 168 N.E.2d at 529, 203 N.Y.S.2d at 87 ("[t]he evidence
presented by the landlord, as developed at the trial, served only to demonstrate
that the intensity of the emergency which prevailed in 1955 (the period reviewed
in the Barr case) has moderated to some extent, but not in substantial degree").

61. See id.
62. In the words of the court:
It is our opinion that such a process of gradual, rather than abrupt,
cessation of controls, commensurate with the moderation in market conditions, effectuates a transition from controls to normal landlord-tenant
relations in a rational and orderly manner, without economic disruption
and dislocation. Such a program "designed to protect and promote the
public health, safety, and general welfare" is hardly capricious and arbitrary, or otherwise violative of constitutional guarantees.
Id. at 182, 168 N.E.2d at 530, 203 N.Y.S.2d at 88.
63. See Note, Rent Control-Review of Emergency Commercial and Business
Space Rent Control Laws-Gradual Cessation of Controls, 7 N.Y.L.F. 81, 90 (1961)
("minority opinion maintained that since the original cause necessitating the acts
had disappeared, the Legislature had no power to reenact the laws; whereas the
majority contended that an emergency still existed in that the effect of a sudden
halt of controls would be disastrous").
64. See Keating, supra note 22, at 128.
65. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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fide public emergency
the laws to lapse.

67

66

combined to persuade legislators to allow

No group has ever conducted a systematic evaluation of New
York City's commercial rent control system. 68 Nevertheless, commercial rent regulation laws and proposals are emerging once again
in response to changes in the commercial rental sector in New York
City. 69

III.

Current Legislative Proposals to Regulate Commercial Rents
in New York

Despite New York's unprecedented and extensive experience with
commercial rent control, there are no such laws currently in force.
Nonetheless, many New York politicians, their constituents, political
action committees, and special interest groups are currently embroiled in a heated debate over whether to restore some sort of
controls on commercial leases.70 Two major proposals have emerged
from the groups supporting commercial rent regulation. 71 The goal
of these proposals is to provide greater protection for small businesses and to restore some bargaining power to commercial tenants
in negotiating leases and rent increases.
A. Intro. 522: Rent Escalation Limitations and Automatic
Right of Renewal
Citing: (1) allegedly exorbitant increases in rents paid by commercial tenants that provide essential goods and services to neighborhoods; and (2) the loss of employment and services of businesses
already forced to close in revitalizing neighborhoods, 72 proponents
of restoring commercial rent control in New York City introduced
7
Intro. 522 into the New York City Council on February 4, 1986. 3

66. See supra notes 56-57, 62 and accompanying text.
67. See Keating, supra note 22, at 128.
68. See id. at 136.
69. See infra notes 72-151 and accompanying text.
70. Daniels, Store Rent Control Is Debated, N.Y. Times, May 25, 1983, at
D21, col. 1.
71. See infra notes 72-146 and accompanying text.
72. See Messinger Statement, supra note 5, at 1 (statement of New York City
Councilwoman Ruth Messinger, primary sponsor of int. No. 658, highlighting
proponents'

arguments for commercial rent control).

73. The proposal for rent escalation limitations and a right of first refusal for
commercial tenants, first introduced to the New York City Council on September
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Unlike the commercial rent control system instituted in New York
after World War 11,1 4 this proposal aimed to preserve "long established" neighborhood small businesses. 75 The proposed legislative
findings declared that a public emergency exists as a result of a
shortage of commercial space for rent.16 The proposal further stated
that the shortage has produced a distortion in relative bargaining
power between landlords and tenants, allowing landlords to exact
oppressive rents from tenants. 7 7 In turn, the neighborhoods that
depend on these merchants for essential goods and services are
threatened with the prospect of either paying exorbitant prices to
purchase the goods or services or losing the availability of such
7
goods and services in their neighborhoods altogether. 1
If enacted, Intro. 522 would cover all of New York City, however, the scope of the bill's protections would be limited to small
businesses situated on commercial premises. 79 Intro. 522 would limit
annual rent increases on commercial leases, both at the time of

27, 1983 as Int. No. 658, was sponsored by Council Member Ruth Messinger and
several co-sponsors. See City of New York Int. No. 658 (Sept. 27, 1983) [hereinafter
Intro. 658]. The bill was reintroduced subsequently as Int. No. 522 in 1986, and
is currently before the City Council. See City of New York Int. No. 522 (Feb. 4,
1986) [hereinafter Intro. 522]. The City Council operates on a four year calendar.
Telephone interview with Gail Brewer, Legislative Assistant to New York City
Councilwoman Ruth Messinger (Feb. 23, 1987). Once a bill is introduced it may
be enacted at anytime before the end of the four year period in which it was
introduced. Id. Once the four year period ends, all unenacted bills must be reintroduced and renumbered before they can be enacted. Id. The New York State
Legislature operates on a two year calendar. Telephone interview with New York
State Assembly Information Office (Mar. 16, 1987). The proposed ordinance, Intro.
522, was originally entitled "Preservation of small businesses in an emergency
situation through limitations on commercial rents." See Intro. 658, supra, at § 1.
74. See supra note 25-69 and accompanying text.
75. See id.; see also Keating, supra note 22, at 153.
76. Intro. 522, supra note 73, § 1.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. Under the proposed ordinance, "commercial premises" means:
[Piremises occupied for non-residential purposes, including but not limited
to retail stores, professional, services and other offices, and manufacturing, assembling or processing. Additionally, retail stores shall mean
stores of ten thousand square feet or less occupying the street level or
one floor above street level; professional, service or other offices shall
mean such establishments which occupy premises of ten thousand square
feet or less; manufacturing, assembling or processing premises shall mean
such premises that occupy twenty-five thousand square feet or less.
Id. § 51-1.0(a).
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renewal 0 and through escalation clauses,"1 to the lesser of ten
percent 2 of the adjusted rent 3 or the prime mortgage interest rate
plus three percent.8 4 The proposal would prohibit landlords from
passing along to tenants any increased costs of services or goods
that would raise the rent above the amount specified by the Act. 5
The annual increase permitted under the proposed New York ordinance, however, would not limit rent adjustments to the pass
through of certain increased costs.8 6 Furthermore, the proposed ordinance would allow landlords automatically to pass along increases
in real property taxes to tenants and to apportion the increased
taxes among them according to the percentage of square feet of
the entire building occupied by each tenant. 7 In cases where there
has been no rent increase prior to the ordinance's effective date,
the proposed ordinance would entitle the landlord to an adjustment
of a percentage of the monthly rent. 8
The proposed ordinance would also require landlords to offer
tenants lease renewals for a minimum of seven years. 9 The tenants
would have an option to lease for a term of shorter duration. 90
A landlord would enjoy a limited right to refuse to renew a lease
if he intended to expand a business in which he owns a majority
interest and has done so for at least four years. 9' The relevant
provision further requires that this business be located either on
the same property lot or within five hundred feet of the lot containing the commercial premises for a period of at least two years. 92

80. See id. § 51-2.0(a).
81. See id.§ 51-2.0(b).
82. See id. § 51-2.0(a).
83. Intro. 522 defines "adjusted rent" as "the greater of the monthly rent of
the premises at the expiration of the previous lease or the initial monthly rent of
the previous lease plus five per centum of the initial monthly rent multiplied by
the number of years less three of the term of the previous lease." Id. § 51-1.0(f).
84. Id. § 51-2.0(a). The latter part of the provision would only come into effect
if the prime rate dropped below seven percent. See id.
85. Id. § 51-6.0.
86. A commercial landlord could increase rent by the percentage specified in
the proposed ordinance as a matter of right. See id. § 51-2.0(a). Increases would
not require justification by any increase in operating costs. See id.
87. See id. § 51-6.0.
88. See id. § 51-1.0(f).
89. See id. § 51-2.0(b).
90. See id.
91. See id. § 51-3.0(a).
92. See id.
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Once a tenant vacates commercial premises, the unit would be
decontrolled temporarily, allowing the landlord to set the rent at
market levels. 93 Once a new commercial tenant signs a lease for the
premises, the unit again would be subject to rent regulation. 94 The
proposed ordinance would deny the privilege to a landlord when a
tenant establishes that harassment by the landlord had caused him
to vacate. 95 If an administrative agency or a court of law upholds
such a claim by a former tenant, the landlord would be liable to

the former tenant for damages of ten times the average of the
proposed new lease's monthly rent or fifty thousand dollars, whichever would be greater. 96 Consequential and punitive damages would
also be available upon such a finding. 97 The proposal futher protects
tenants by limiting security deposits to three month's rent. 98

Intro. 522 would charge the Department of Housing Preservation
and Development (HPD) with the responsibility of enforcing the
provisions of the ordinance. 99 The HPD commissioner would be
empowered to impose penalties upon landlords willfully violating
any provision'0° and to grant hardship increases greater than the
specified rate of return.' 0 In addition, the measure would permit

93. See id. § 51-2.0(e).
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See id. § 51-2.0(f).
99. See id. § 51-4.0(a); id.§ 51-1.0(c).
100. See id. § 51-4.0(a).
101. See id. § 51-8.0(a). Under the proposed ordinance, a rent sufficient to provide a reasonable rate of return comprises:
[T]he lesser of (1) a rent sufficient to provide for (i) the payment of
the actual costs of operation and maintenance of such real property and
of providing essential services to the occupants thereof and the actual
amount of all real estate taxes, special assessments and water and sewer
rents and charges to be paid with respect to such real property; (ii) the
establishment of reasonable and necessary repairs so that a reasonable
return on the capital value of the real property in which such commercial
premises is located can provide for debt service and return on equity,
which reasonable return shal [sic] be a percentage of the value of such
real property determined equal to seven percent of the total assessed
value for the tax year previous to that in which the application is made
of such real property plus three percent of the assessed value for the
tax year of the improvements included therein previous to that in which
the application is made, or
(2) A rent which will yield a net annual return of three percent plus the
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judicial review as part of the enforcement mechanism.'°2 Since Intro.
522 was proposed as an emergency measure, the New York City
Council would periodically review it.10
Proponents of commercial rent regulation introduced a virtually
identical bill in the New York State Legislature in 1983.104 Although
the bill passed in the State Assembly Housing Committee by a wide
margin, the bill was never reported out of the Assembly Ways and
Means Committee.' 0 5 Legislators supporting the proposed bill did
not subsequently reintroduce it.
B. Bills Proposing a Tenant's Right of First Refusal and
Binding Arbitration
The most recent major initiatives to control rent increases on
commercial property are bills that propose first to give landlords
and tenants the opportunity to negotiate a new rent, and then, in
cases in which no agreement is reached, to trigger a system of last
offer binding arbitration to set the new rent. Although only one of
the two arbitration proposals was pending in the state legislature and
the New York City Council during the 1985-86 session, this Note will
examine both proposals.
1.

The Commercial Tenant Protection Act (CTPA)
Legislators supporting rent regulation on commercial premises
introduced the Commercial Tenant Protection Act (CTPA) in the

prevailing annual rate interest charged by banks in the state of New
York for new first mortgages on real property as determined by the
superintendant of banks of the state of New York based on the cash
payment received by the seller plus that amount paid by the landlord
which is credited towards the principal owned [sic] by such owner to
any mortgagee.

Id. § 51-8.0(b).
102. See id. § 51-9.0.
103. See Keating, supra note 22, at 158.
104. N.Y.S. 6594, N.Y.A. 6983, 207th Sess. (1984) [hereinafter N.Y.S. 6594,
N.Y.A. 6983]. The bill proposed in the state legislature provided any local government the option of limiting commercial rent increases upon a finding by the
local legislative body that an emergency exists. See Memorandum in Support of
Legislation, Bill No. N.Y.S. 6594, N.Y.A. 6983 (available at Fordham Urban Law
Journal office). Intro. 522 would cover only New York City. See Intro. 522, supra
note 73, § 2. However, unlike Intro. 658, the previously proposed ordinance in
New York City, N.Y.S. 6594, N.Y.A. 6983 only applies to businesses with fewer
than 100 employees at the leasehold location. See Rothman, Limit Business Rents,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1983, at A21, col. 2.
105. Schmuckler, Bigger Clout for Small Business?, City Business (undated)
(available at Fordham Urban Law Journal office).
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New York State Assembly on March 25, 1986,'0 6 and supporters
in the New York City Council introduced a virtually identical version the following month. 017 In this Note, unless otherwise indicated,
both bills are referred to collectively as the CTPA.' °0
The proposed legislative findings of the CTPA declare that pressures on the commercial rental market have engendered a shift in
relative bargaining power in favor of the landlord at the expense
of the tenant.' °9 The findings attribute the closing of many small
businesses, the threat posed to the viability of neighborhoods, and
instability in the rental market to this imbalance."10 The intent of
the legislation is to restore parity to the relative bargaining power
of landlords and commercial tenants."'

106. N.Y.S. 5479-B, N.Y.A. 10174-B, 209th Sess. (1986) [hereinafter N.Y.S.
5479-B, N.Y.A. 10174-B]. The proposal was originally presented to the Legislature
in 1985. See N.Y.A. 6913, 208th Sess. (1985) [hereinafter N.Y.A. 6913]. After
failing to win enough support, legislators reintroduced the bill in 1986 as N.Y.S.
5479-B, N.Y.A. 10174-B. The bill, entitled the "Commercial Tenant Protection
Act" (CTPA), will be referred to accordingly in this Note. See id. Initially, the
bill was entitled the "Small Business Preservation Act" (SBPA). See N.Y.A. 6913.
Despite the change in title, the substantive provisions of the proposed law are
generally the same. Compare N.Y.S. 5479-B, N.Y.A. 10174-B with N.Y.A. 6913.
107. See City of New York Int. No. 581 (Apr. 10, 1986) [hereinafter Intro.
581]. In 1985, New York City Council Member Abraham Gerges was the primary
sponsor of City of New York Int. No. 988, a bill that proposed a similar plan
of right of first refusal and last offer binding arbitration. City of New York Int.
No. 988 (June 21, 1985) [hereinafter Intro. 988]. When Intro. 988 was not enacted,
two of its sponsors in the City Council became co-sponsors of Intro. 581, which
is broader and does not require a landlord to secure a prospective new commercial
tenant before the sitting tenant exercises its right of first refusal. Compare Intro.
581, § 26-804(d)(2) with Intro. No. 988, § 51-3.0(3).
108. There are three main differences between the bills. First, the Assembly bill
is enabling legislation which would provide local governments with the powers
described in it upon a finding of an emergency, whereas the City Council bill
would grant the described powers, -indicating in the Legislative Findings that an
emergency presently exists. Compare N.Y.S. 5479-B, N.Y.A. 10174-B, supra note
106, § 282 with Intro. 581, supra note 107 Section one. Second, unlike the bill
in the state legislature, the City Council bill includes a provision requiring the
establishment of review periods to consider rent adjustments in longer term leases.
See Intro. 581, supra note 107, § 26-806. Third, while the City Council bill covers
all "commercial premises," the Assembly bill is more narrowly constructed to
include only those "commercial premises" under ten thousand square feet. Compare
N.Y.S. 5479-B, N.Y.A. 10174-B, supra note 106, § 284(1) with Intro. 581, supra
note 107, § 26-802(a).
109. See N.Y.S. 5479-B, N.Y.A. 10174-B, supra note 106, § 282; Intro. 581,
supra note 107, Section one.
110. See supra note 109.
111. See id.
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The bill would seek to achieve its objective by establishing specific
rules and procedures that landlords must observe both in refusing
to renew leases and in renewing leases and setting new rents. The
CTPA would grant commercial tenants a qualified right of lease
renewal for a minimum of five years, however, the tenant could
opt for a lease of shorter duration. 1 2 The tenant's renewal right
is qualified by the landlord's right to refuse to renew with proof
of one or more of the grounds prescribed in the statute.M3 If the
sole reason the landlord refuses to renew is that he either intends
to demolish the space or intends to carry on his own business at
the location, the tenant is then entitled to compensation. 1 4 In the
event that the lease contains no provisions for compensation, arbitrators will determine fair compensation." 5
If the landlord wishes to refuse renewal of a commercial tenant's
lease, the landlord must notify the tenant at least 240 days prior
to the expiration of the lease, stating in detail the reasons for the

112. See N.Y.S. 5479-B, N.Y.A. 10174-B, supra note 106, § 287(1); Intro. 581,
supra note 107, § 26-804(a).
113. The landlord may refuse to renew a commercial lease with proof of one
or more of the following grounds: (1) the tenant's failure to maintain the property;
(2) consistently late payment of rent provided the landlord has served at least three
prior notices during the life of the lease and each notice of late payment was
occasioned by two weeks tardiness to justify the notice; (3) breach of obligations
of the lease; (4) conduct which contributes any form of illegal activity on the
premises; (5) use of the space for reasons other than those set forth in the lease;
(6) nuisance, discomfort or safety hazards to other tenants caused by the tenant
being denied lease renewal; (7) the landlord's intent to demolish the space; (8) the
landlord's intent to carry on his own business at the location; and (9) the tenant
sublets the space without notifying the landlord. See N.Y.S. 5479-B, N.Y.A. 10174B, supra note 106, § 287(1)(a)-(i); Intro. 581, supra note 107, § 26-804(a)(1)-(9).
In order for the landlord to deny renewal by demolishing the space or carrying
on his own business at the location, he must have been the landlord of record
for at least three years prior to the termination date. See N.Y.& 5479-B, N.Y.A.
10174-B, supra note 106, § 287(1)(f), (g); Intro. 581, supra note 107, § 26804(a)(6), (a)(7).
Unlike the City Council bill, the Assembly bill allows a landlord to terminate
a lease without giving a reason for nonrenewal provided that the landlord satisfy
certain conditions: (1) that the tenant be notified at least 240 days prior to expiration
of the lease; and (2) that the tenant be compensated in an amount equaling three
months rent for each year the tenant has been in possession of the premises, using
the last month's rent of the last year of the lease to calculate the amount due.
See N.Y.S. 5479-B, N.Y.A. 10174-B, supra note 106, § 287(1)0).
114. See N.Y.S. 5479-B, N.Y.A. 10174-B, supra note 106, § 287(2); Intro. 581,
supra note 107, § 26-803(b).
115. See supra note 114.
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decision. 16 The tenant is free to challenge the validity of the land-

17
lord's refusal within twenty-one days after receiving the notice.,
The parties must then submit all relevant documentation and
evidence"' to an arbitration panel, 1 9 which will notify both parties
of its decision within twenty-one days of the hearing. 20 The panel's
1 21
decision would be final and binding upon both parties.
In the event that the landlord is willing to renegotiate a lease
agreement, he must notify the tenant of his willingness at least 180
days prior to the expiration of the lease.1 22 The negotiation period
extends for 180 days, starting on the date of the first physical
meeting of the parties, not on the date of notification. 2 1 If the
period runs beyond the expiration date of the old lease, the tenant

116. See N.Y.S. 5479-B, N.Y.A. 10174-B, supra note 106, § 287(3)(a); Intro.
581, supra note 107, § 26-804(c)(1).
117. See supra note 116.
118. See id. "The landlord and tenant will each be given no more than one day
to present their case. They shall be allowed to present testimony, witnesses, pictures,
videos, documents and any other relevant data. Every party shall be allowed to
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses." Intro. 581, supra note 107, § 26804(c)(2); see N.Y.S. 5479-B, N.Y.A. 10174-B, supra note 106, § 287(3)(b). The
arbitrators, however, are not to rely solely on the tenant to ensure the accuracy
of the documentation. See N.Y.S. 5479-B, N.Y.A. 10174-B, supra note 106, §
287(3)(a); Intro. 581, supra note 107, § 26-804(c)(1). Thus, they must decide, inter
alia, whether to inspect the space or hire expert consultants such as a real estate
accountant to check for data manipulation. See id.; N.Y.S. 5479-B, N.Y.A. 10174-

B, supra note 106, § 287(3)(a).
119. The arbitration panel shall consist of one to three members, the number
and specific arbitrators to be determined by the parties or by the arbitration company
in the event that the landlord and tenant cannot agree. See N.Y.S. 5479-B, N.Y.A.
10174-B, supra note 106, § 287(3)(b); Intro. 581, supra note 107, § 26-804(c)(2).
120. See N.Y.S. 5479-B, N.Y.A. 10174-B, supra note 106, § 287(3)(b); Intro.
581, supra note 107, § 26-804(c)(2). If the landlord prevails, then the tenant will
have until the end of the current lease to vacate. See N.Y.S. 5479-B, N.Y.A.
10174-B, supra note 106, § 287(3)(b); Intro. 581, supra note 107, § 26-804(c)(2).
If the panel decides in favor of the tenant, then the landlord must notify the
tenant within one hundred and eighty days prior to the expiration of the lease
that the landlord is prepared to renegotiate the lease with the tenant. See N.Y.S.
5479-B, N.Y.A. 10174-B, supra note 106, § 287(3)(b); Intro. 581, supra note 107,
§ 26-804(c)(2).
121. See N.Y.S. 5479-B, N.Y.A. 10174-B, supra note 106, § 287(3)(b); Intro.
581, supra note 107, § 26-804(c)(2).
122. The CTPA provides that a landlord of commercial premises must notify
tenants in writing no later than 180 days prior to the expiration of the lease to
indicate his willingness to renegotiate the lease agreement. See N.Y.S. 5479-B,
N.Y.A. 10174-B, supra note 106, § 287(4)(a); Intro. 581, supra note 107, § 26804(d)(1).
123. See N.Y.S. 5479-B, N.Y.A. 10174-B, supra note 106, § 287(4)(a); Intro.
581, supra note 107, § 26-804(d)(1).
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continues to pay rent at the old rate until the parties reach an
124
agreement or the arbitration panel renders a decision.
If after the first ninety days of the 180-day period the parties
do not reach an agreement, the landlord may request a hearing
before the local arbitration panel.' 25 The landlord and the tenant
shall each submit the exact rental figure each party believes to be
a fair rent for the commercial space in dispute. 126 In addition, the
parties must furnish the panel as well as one another with all
documentary evidence supporting their cases. 27 Each party may defend his rent figure before the panel for one day. 28
The arbitration panel will choose either the landlord's or the
tenant's rent figure' 29-there will be no compromise figure. 3 0 The
proposed law vests the panel with broad discretion in formulating
the criteria relied upon in deciding the most equitable rent of the
two figures proposed' and requires the panel to give due consid32
eration to several criteria set forth in the statute.

124. See N.Y.S. 5479-B, N.Y.A. 10174-B, supra note 106, § 287(4)(a); Intro.
581, supra note 107, § 26-804(d)(1).
125. See N.Y.S. 5479-B, N.Y.A. 10174-B, supra note 106, § 287(4)(a); Intro.
581, supra note 107, § 26-804(d)(1).
126. See N.Y.S. 5479-B, N.Y.A. 10174-B, supra note 106, § 287(4)(a); Intro.
581, supra note 107, § 26-804(d)(1).
127. See N.Y.S. 5479-B, N.Y.A. 10174-B, supra note 106, § 287(4)(a); Intro.
581, supra note 107, § 26-804(d)(1). Documentary evidence may include, but would
not be limited to, bills, leases, cancelled checks, receipts, agreements, and premises'
purchase price, maintenance and operating costs, mortgage and tax documents. See
id. If any of the information supplied to the panel in supporting documentation
proves to be false, inaccurate or misleading, then the panel mustrule in favor of
the opposing party even before the hearings. See N.Y.S. 5479-B, N.Y.A. 10174B, supra note 106, § 287(4)(a); Intro. 581, supra note 107, § 26-804(d)(1). All
evidence submitted is subject to verification and investigation by the panel or hired
experts. See N.Y.S. 5479-B, N.Y.A. 10174-B, supra note 106, § 287(4)(a); Intro.
581, supra note 107, § 26-804(d)(1).
128. See N.Y.S. 5479-B, N.Y.A. 10174-B, supra note 106, § 287(4)(b); Intro.
581, supra note 107, § 26-804(d)(2). In addition, the landlord and tenant may
defend their respective rent figures through the use of various forms of documentation, including charts, pictures, witnesses and videos to help express their
point of view. See N.Y.S. 5479-B, N.Y.A. 10174-B, supra note 106, § 287(4)(b);
Intro. 581, supra note 107, § 26-804(d)(2). The CTPA would permit the confrontation
and cross-examination of adverse witnesses. See N.Y.S. 5479-B, N.Y.A. 10174-B,
supra note 106, § 287(4)(b); Intro. 581, supra note 107, § 26-804(d)(2).
129. See N.Y.S. 5479-B, N.Y.A. 10174-B, supra note 106, § 287(4)(a); Intro.
581, supra note 107, § 26-804(d)(1).
130. See supra note 129.
131. See N.Y.S. 5479-B, N.Y.A. 10174-B, supra note 106, § 287(4)(b); Intro.
581, supra note 107, § 26-804(d)(2).
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The panel must notify the parties of its decision within twentyone days after the hearing.'
If the panel decides in favor of the
landlord, the tenant has the "right of first refusal" to remain in
possession at the new rent rate. 3 4 If the tenant declines to renew
at that rent, he has ninety days from the date notice is received to
vacate the premises.' 35 Alternatively, if the panel decides in favor
of the landlord and the tenant declines to exercise the right of first
refusal, the parties may negotiate a settlement for a term of less
than five years and for an amount different from that set by the
arbitrators, provided the Arbitration Board receives a written copy
13 6
of the special agreement.
The CTPA also establishes certain other rights and protections
for both landlords and tenants. The Act provides that security
deposits cannot exceed an amount equal to three month's rent and
that a landlord place all security deposits in interest-bearing accounts.' 37 In any case in which a landlord retaliates against a tenant
for the tenant's assertion or exercise of any right under the Act,
the landlord may be liable for actual and punitive damages, injunctive relief, and attorney's fees.' 38 The CTPA guarantees to tenants the right to assign their lease to the purchaser of the tenant's

132. See supra note 131. The criteria set forth in N.Y.S. 5479-B, N.Y.A. 10174B and Intro. 581 include: (1) cost of maintenance and operation of the space; (2)
location of the space; (3) character of the location, and the character of the stores
in the location; (4) size of the space; (5) kind, quality, and quantity of services
furnished, (6) the condition of the space; (7) current interest rate on bank deposits
and U.S. government bonds; (8) the current inflation rate and the individual
components of the inflation index; (9) the lease history; and (10) capital improvements made by the tenant. Id. Furthermore, the "panel shall consider that each
commercial tenant and landlord relationship is unique and should be dealt with
as such." N.Y.S. 5479-B, N.Y.A. 10174-B, supra note 106, § 287(4)(b); see also
Intro. 581, supra note 107, § 26-804(d)(2).
133. See N.Y.S. 5479-B, N.Y.A. 10174-B, supra note 106, § 287(4)(b); Intro.
581, supra note 107, § 26-804(d)(2).
134. See supra note 133.
135. See supra note 133.
136. See supra note 133.

137. See N.Y.S. 5479-B, N.Y.A. 10174-B, supra note 106, § 289; Intro. 581,
supra note 107, § 26-807. Interest received from such amounts shall be paid at
least annually to tenants, less one percent to cover a landlord's administrative costs.
See id.; N.Y.S. 5479-B, N.Y.A. 10174-B, supra note 106, § 289.
138. See N.Y.S. 5479-B, N.Y.A. 10174-B, supra note 106, § 289-c; Intro. 581,
supra note 107, § 26-810. In addition to any remedy awarded to a tenant against
a landlord by a court, any proven retaliation will be cause for the arbitration panel
to rule in favor of the tenant if a hearing is in progress. See id.; N.Y.S. 5479B, N.Y.A. 10174-B, supra note 106, § 289-c.
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business, provided the purchaser can comply with the terms of the
lease and that the landlord can be paid for any necessary and
reasonable expenses caused by the assignment.3 9 The Act prohibits
lease provisions for increases that pass along costs that raise the
rent above the agreed upon base rent.14°
Landlords, however, may increase rent charged above the base
rent in either of two instances: (1) when the local government has
raised real property taxes on the premises, in which case the landlord may apportion the increase among the commercial tenants
according to the percentage of the total square footage that each
tenant occupies; 14 and (2) when the landlord has successfully petitioned the arbitration panel to pass along the cost of completed
capital improvements that will directly benefit the tenant.142 Although
a landlord may waive any of his rights granted by the CTPA, the
CTPA declares invalid any provision in a lease that waives or
43
diminishes any right of a tenant.1

The CTPA would be applied prospectively,'" and as emergency
legislation, would be subject to annual evaluation by an arbitration
company 45 in a report to the legislative body enacting it.146
C.

Intro. 1017: Moratorium on Rent Increases

Intro. 1017 introduced into the New York City Council on September 12, 1985, seeks to freeze rents on the effective date of the
ordinance and to place a moratorium on rent increases on com-

139. See N.Y.S. 5479-B, N.Y.A. 10174-B, supra note 106, § 289-d; Intro. 581,
supra note 107, § 26-811.
140. See N.Y.S. 5479-B, N.Y.A. 10174-B, supra note 106, § 289-a; Intro. 581,
supra note 107, § 26-808.
141. See supra note 140.
142. See N.Y.S. 5479-B, N.Y.A. 10174-B, supra note 106, § 289-b; Intro. 581,
supra note 107, § 26-809.
143. See N.Y.S. 5479-B, N.Y.A. 10174-B, supra note 106, § 289-e; Intro. 581,
supra note 107, § 26-812.
144. See N.Y.S. 5479-B, N.Y.A. 10174-B, supra note 106, § 2; Intro. 581, supra
note 107, § 3.
145. An independent private company which specializes in arbitration would
administer the arbitration program created pursuant to the CTPA. See N.Y.S. 5479B, N.Y.A. 10174-B, supra note 106, § 288; Intro. 581, supra note 107, § 26-805.
The local government or appropriate government agency would enter into and make
an annual review of the contract with the company before renewal. N.Y.S. 5479B, N.Y.A. 10174-B, supra note 106, § 288; Intro. 581, supra note 107, § 26-805.
146. See N.Y.S. 5479-B, N.Y.A. 10174-B, supra note 106, § 289-g; Intro. 581,
supra note 107, § 26-814.
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mercial premises. 147 The moratorium would continue for eighteen
months or until the Council repeals the ordinance or imposes a
system of commercial rent regulation, whichever is sooner. 48 The
proposed ordinance prescribes penalties for its violation, 49 and permits increases in rent only for a share of increased property taxes
in proportion to square footage of the'entire premises that each
tenant occupies. 50 Proponents of the proposed ordinance do not
consider it a long-term solution to the problems associated with
commercial rents. Instead, the proposed measure seeks to prevent
any harm that might befall small businesses before legislators can
enact protective legislation.' 5 '
IV.

The Inadvisability of Legislated Commercial Rent
Regulation Systems

The wisdom of imposing any commercial rent regulation system

rests not on its ability to withstand constitutional challenges5

2

in

147. City of New York Intro. No. 1017, § 51-2.0(a) (Sept. 12, 1985) [hereinafter
Intro. 1017]. Section 51-1.0(a) of Intro. 1017 contains the same definition of
"tcommercial premises" as does Intro. 522, § 51-1.0(a). For this definition, see
supra note 79.

148. Intro. 1017, supra note 146, § 51-2.0(a).
149. Id. § 51-2.0(c).
150. Id. § 51-3.0(a).
151. Id. § 1.
152. The grounds of such claims have included taking without just compensation,
impairment of contracts, the denial of equal protection, and the violation of federal
antitrust laws. See Keating, supra note 22, at 161-78. For a discussion on why
contract clause claims, equal protection clause claims and other challenges have
failed in the past and signal no significant change in the future, see id. A recent
Supreme Court decision on a Berkeley, California, residential rent control ordinance
indicates that an antitrust challenge to commercial rent control as constituting
unlawful price fixing will fail. In Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 106 S. Ct. 1045
(1986), challengers of Berkeley's residential rent control ordinance sought to invalidate the ordinance on the grounds that it was not covered by the state action
exemption under which municipal governments are granted an implied exemption
from the coverage of federal antitrust laws, since there was no state policy authorizing
the regulations. See 106 S. Ct. at 1048. The Court held that the local rent control
ordinance did not constitute concerted action within the meaning of section one
of the Sherman Antitrust Act. See id. at 1049-50. Thus, regardless of any state
action exemption, the ordinance did not violate the Sherman Antitrust Act. See
id. at 1051. Section one of the Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits only concerted
actions or conspiracies in restraint of trade between separate entities, see id. at
1051, not restraints "unilaterally imposed on the landlords by the city" to the
exclusion of private control. Id. at 1051. "A restraint imposed unilaterally by
government does not become concerted action within the meaning of the statute
simply because it has a coercive effect upon parties who must obey the law." Id.
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the courtroom but rather, on the underlying policy issues. Although
neighborhood stability, adequate provision of basic goods and services to communities, and the preservation of small businesses are
valid concerns that must be addressed, legislators must resist the

temptation to enact commercial rent regulations as a panacea for
the many social and economic ills faced by urban neighborhoods.

The problems demand a more sophisticated approach involving programs more narrowly tailored to particular community needs; moreover, in the long run, commercial rent regulations will only
exacerbate several problems faced by many cities today. These problems include: (1) physical degradation of the commercial property
stock; (2) stunting of economic growth; and (3) fundamental unfairness to landlords.
A.

Physical Degradation

53
Imposing commercial rent controls will lead to disinvestment
and overall physical degradation of commercial properties. 5 4 When

at 1049-50.
The Court's opinion in Fisher effectively blunts antitrust attacks on commercial
rent controls. " 'The net effect is to remove the antitrust laws as a significant
source of restraint on a panoply of state and local government regulatory activity.' "
Strict Rent Control Upheld, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1986, at BI1, col. 2. At the
present time, the only way to invalidate commercial rent controls on antitrust
grounds is to show that a government regulatory power, see 106 S. Ct. at 1050,
or that a government-administered price stabilization scheme, is really a "private
price-fixing conspiracy, concealed under a 'gauzy cloak of state involvement.' "
Id. at 1051. Neither possibility seems to pose a great threat to commercial rent
control programs that are carefully constructed and executed.
153. To understand why disinvestment in the commercial property sector occurs,
one must examine investor expectations and how rent controls would affect the
value of an investment in rental property. When an investor purchases a commercial
property his investment has two components: (1) the current value of the underlying
asset with its potential to appreciate, here called the capital value; and (2) the
current rate of return on the property, usually expressed as a percentage of the
market value of the asset. See W. KLEIN, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE:
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 208 (1980) [hereinafter KLEIN]. In a free market,
the capital value and the current return are directly proportionate, i.e., as one
increases or decreases the other must follow in the same direction. Thus, if rent
controls artificially restrain the current return, i.e., the stream of rental payments,
the capital value of the property will also be depressed.
To illustrate, suppose that a building produces net income of $8,000, after all
expenses and after making proper allowance for replacement. In addition, assume
that the appropriate rate of return on such investments is 10%1o. The formula for
determining capital value is P=A/r, where P is the capital value, A is the level
annual amount or current return, and r is the rate of return. See KLEIN, supra,
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taxes, in tandem with property values and mortgage obligations,

at 208-09. Applying the given values, the capital value would be $80,000, determined
as follows: P=A/r=$8,000/.10= $80,000. However, if expected net income were
$5,000, the capital value would be only $50,000 ($5,000!. 10). By limiting the current
return (A) as rent controls would, capital value would be depressed. Thus, if an
investor knows that his investment will yield $8,000 per annum and that the
appropriate interest rate on such investments is 10%, the investor can ask himself
what amount would he be required to invest in order to produce that income at
that interest rate.. The answer is $80,000, since at 10%, $80,000 will yield $8,000
per annum. See id. Thus, if there is a different investment vehicle with approximately
the same risk in which one could invest a lesser amount and earn the same income
or invest the same amount and earn more income, the rational investor would
move his money into these more lucrative investment vehicles. See id. In the case
of commercial rental property, capping the current return would not only deprive
the owner of some net income that the property would generate in a free market
but would also decrease the capital value of the property. In essence, if he wanted
to sell the property he would be forced to sell it for less assuming other investment
opportunities with higher rates of return existed. As values adjusted to reflect the
artificially limited yield of an investment in commercial rental property, existing
commercial property owners would be forced to bear the cost of this shift in terms
of the loss of capital value. Thus, it follows that disinvestment in the commercial
rental property sector, that is, the lack of new construction and renovation of old
buildings, would occur since the capital outlay required to construct or renovate
a building is substantial and could be placed in a higher yielding investment
opportunity of comparable risk. A particular mutual fund could conceivably yield
the same return as a building in New York City yet the capital outlay for the
construction or renovation of a building would likely greatly exceed the cost of
shares in a mutual fund. Even if an investor desired to invest in constructing or
renovating commercial rental property, he could do so in some city other than
New York City where his current return would not be restrained by commercial
rent controls.
Arguably, one of the proposed bills to control rent increases in New York City,
Intro. 522, supra notes 72-105 and accompanying text, would only limit increases
on retail tenants occupying up to 10,000 square feet of space and manufacturing
tenants occupying up to 25,000 square feet of space and consequently, would not
affect rents charged on commercial properties designed for tenants occupying larger
spaces. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. However, one commentator's
analysis of rent control in the residential rental sector in New York City indicates
a different conclusion. See Olsen, An Econometric Analysis of Rent Control, 80
J. POL. EcON. 1081 (1972). The commentator asserted that the cost of producing
housing service in the uncontrolled market is quite likely higher than it would have
been had rent control been terminated in New York City shortly after the Second
World War. See id. at 1098. The existence of rent control in New York City
probably causes owners of uncontrolled rental housing to be sensitive to the
possibility of changes in the rent control law that would inflict capital losses on
them. For example, in 1969, a limited form of rent control was extended to over
half of the then-uncontrolled residential rental stock. Unlike other housing markets
where rent control terminated fifteen to twenty years earlier and landlords most
likely do not consider the imposition of rent control very probable, it is reasonable
to expect that investors in.
rental housing in New York City will demand and receive
a higher-risk premium. See id. "If this argument is correct ...the long-run supply
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rise more rapidly than rents, the cash flow available for physical

maintenance decreases.' 55 A continuing rise in property values, with
resulting potential capital gains, will act as an incentive for increased expenditures by a landlord on maintenance and capital im-

provements in order to preserve and enhance the value of his
investment. 1 6 When property values level off the landlord will increase expenditures on maintenance and capital improvements only
57
insofar as they will allow him to command higher rents.
Placing an artificial ceiling on rents that a landlord may charge

for a commercial space eliminates incentive to maintain and improve
the property and limits or reduces the landlord's net operating
income.' 5 8 The only means for a landlord to increase his net opprice of housing service in the uncontrolled market in 1968 was greater than it
would have been had rent control never gone into effect in New York City. This
implies that the occupants of uncontrolled housing were worse off than they would
have been in the absence of rent control." Id. Logically, if part of the commercial
rental sector were subject to rent control, the owners would be sensitive to the
possible legislative caprice of extending rent controls to include their property and
would reflect this fear in their demand for a high-risk premium. See id. Therefore,
partial control of the commercial rental sector would place upward pressure on
prices charged on uncontrolled properties in addition to upward pressure on rents
created by heightened competition among merchants for space as a result of
commercial tenants' reluctance to move out of controlled premises. See infra note
179 and accompanying text.
154. "While it may be possible to establish the rent that would be charged for
a given unit of space, it is virtually impossible to regulate the quality of space.
Rent regulation will encourage disinvestment leading to substantial deterioration of
the city's commercial building stock." Charaton-Berger, Real Estate Community
Must Act to Defeat Commercial Rent Control, Real Estate Today (undated) (emphasis added) (available at Fordham Urban Law Journal office).
155. Baar, Guidelines For Drafting Rent Control Laws: Lessons of a Decade,
35 RUTGERS L. REV. 723, 739 (1983) [hereinafter Baar].
156. See id. ("[als long as valiaes continue to rise, potential capital gains may
provide an incentive for increases in maintenance and capital improvements").
157. See id. ("[wihen values reach a plateau only cash flow incentives for
maintenance remain").
158. One commentator stated:
The impact of reductions in net operating income and value resulting
from stringent rent restrictions may differ from that of market-induced
reductions in net operating income. Often the rent-controlled reductions
in income are accompanied by increased rather than decreased tenant
stability. However, they too lead to a reduction in funds available for
maintenance, and reduce the certainty that is required to induce longterm maintenance.
Id.; see also PRIVATE REINVESTMENT, supra note 8, at 122 ("reinvestment disincentives
created by commercial rent control could seriously hinder the improvement of retail
areas in need of revitalization .... If rent control eliminated the possibility of

future returns to offset the risks, needed improvements to such commercial streets
would not be made by private investors").
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erating income, in fact, is to reduce expenditures on maintenance
and capital improvements. 5 9 Thus, the commercial property will

physically deteriorate. A common sense view of the situation indicates that in many situations a landlord's interest in at least
protecting an investment in commercial property without enhancing
it will probably not be as great as his interest in maintaining or

increasing net operating income. Additionally, in tight commercial
property markets, such as New York City,60 the incentive to protect
one's investment through maintenance and improvements will be
further weakened by the fact that a tenant will often be willing
61
to rent the property regardless of its condition.1

Ultimately, the ill effects of rent control will touch tenants, landlords, and city residents. Commercial tenants will be trapped in
buildings that are caught in a pattern of irreversible physical de-

terioration. The city's ability to attract new businesses to increase
employment and the tax rolls will be hampered since it will be

unable to offer an attractive commercial property stock.

62

The

159. See supra'note 157.
160. See The New York Recovery: Can It Be Sustained?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13,
1985, § 12, at 12, col. 4 (given that vacancy rate in New York City has hovered
near 2% for decades, "[i]f the region continues to generate new housing at its
current rate, the Regional Plan Association predicts, it will supply only 1.3 million
of the 2.7 million new dwelling units the economy will need"); see also infra note

164.
161. Baar, supra note 155, at 739. Under certain types of rent control programs,
the trend of physical degradation of the commercial property would accelerate even
more. For example, under one of the plans offered to legislators in New York to

control commercial rents, a landlord may pass along the costs of capital improvements to tenants only after showing a panel established by the ordinance that the
tenant will directly benefit from the improvement. See N.Y.S. 5479-B, N.Y.A.
10174-B, supra note 106, § 289-b; Intro. 581, supra note 107, § 26-809. This plan
would discourage landlords from engaging in certain capital improvements that are
necessary to preserve the physical plant yet do not necessarily benefit any single
tenant directly. For instance, sandblasting may be necessary to protect the facade
of a building from corrosive agents; however, no single tenant may be said to
benefit directly from the process.
162. For example, the Upper West Side of Manhattan from 70th Street to 86th
Street is an area generally agreed to be flourishing economically and growing in
popularity as a result of extensive reinvestment activity between 1970 and 1980.
PRIVATE REINVESTMENT, supra note 8, at i. "Between 1977 and 1982, the city's
real property tax bill for the stretch of Columbus Avenue [on the Upper West
Side] between 63rd Street and 86th Street increased from $2,319,000 to
$3,824,400." Testimony on Commercial Rent Control Before The City Council on
Economic Development 4 (Feb. 28, 1984) (statement presented for The Real Estate
Board of New York, Inc.). One real estate professional has observed that the
additional $1,505,400 in revenue pays for a great deal of police protection and
sanitation service. See id.
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property owner will suffer decline in the value of his investment 63
as the property deteriorates, 164 with the result that he may eventually
165
abandon it altogether.

B.

Stunting Economic Growth and Desired Change
Although commercial rent regulation would allow merchants
and

businessmen with longstanding ties to neighborhoods to remain in
business in the particular location without the fear of being driven
out by large rent increases, the regulations would breed economic
distortions. As the complexion of a neighborhood changes in terms

of age, ethnicity, affluence, and other factors, local commercial
areas must adapt to the changing tastes and demands or risk losing
66
their customers to other areas that are more responsive.

163. See infra note 152.

164. See infra notes 153-58 and accompanying
165. The experience of New York City in the
demonstrates how the landlord's plight becomes
1981 housing abandonment contributed heavily to
81,000 units. See PRIVATE

REINVESTMENT,

text.
rent-controlled residential sector
the city's plight. From 1978 to
New York's loss of an estimated

supra note 8, at 125.

166. The Small Retail Business Study Commission recognized that "[t]he maintenance of viable patterns of neighborhood life assumes reasonably convenient access
of residents to establishments which sell regularly used and frequently purchased
goods and services." INTERIM REPORT, supra note 11, at 11-1. The Commission
further observed that 83.5%o of all purchases in convenience goods stores within
New York City are made in residential neighborhoods, as opposed to in central
business districts or major retail centers. See id.
Imposing commercial rent controls threatens to deprive residents of easy access
to desired goods and services by impeding this natural change in the types of
services offered when the population of the neighborhood changes. See Prospects
for Commercial Rent Control in New York: Testimony Before the Economic
Development Committee of the New York City Council 5 (June 27, 1985) (statement

by Gerard C. S. Mildner, Manhattan Institute for Policy Research) [hereinafter
Mildner]. New York City has, in the past, witnessed changes in the types of
businesses that serve an area as the consumer demands of neighborhood residents
change through migration or aging. See id. For example, the change in the population
of the Upper West Side has been accompanied by the opening of new businesses
such as restaurants, boutiques and specialty stores that cater to the young and the
affluent. See id. Similarly, the influx of population to Flushing has been followed
by the appearance of more Korean restaurants and grocery stores. As Jackson
Heights in Queens has become more Hispanic, more Spanish cuisine restaurants
and bodegas have opened. See id. Thus, while rent control might help prolong the
operation of some businesses, it might do so at the expense of an area's economic
evolution and growth. See id.
In fact, in the commercial rental sector, in which no rent controls currently exist,
accessibility of everyday retail goods and services does not appear to be a significant
problem. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 11-15. The Shopper Survey conducted
for the Commission revealed that nine out of ten shoppers typically used neigh-
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In turn, impeding change in the types of goods and services
offered in an area deprives neighborhood residents of the easy
accessibility to the goods and services that they most desire. 167 The
free market has not always produced easy accessibility to the perfect
mix of retail services for a neighborhood; 16 1 yet there is no guarantee that commercial rent controls would succeed where the free
market has failed. Businesses frequently close or relocate for reasons
unrelated to rent levels.' 69 If a business closed in a neighborhood,
commercial rent control would provide no assurance that economic
forces would find a similar business to replace it.' 7° Other factors,

borhood stores, whether the shopping trips entailed perishable or bulky goods,
small grocery stores or large supermarkets, cleaners or stationery stores. See id.
For shoppers who reported shopping at times outside their own neighborhoods for
everyday items, only 18% cited lower prices. See id. This relatively low figure is
further diluted by the fact that the survey permitted respondents to supply multiple
reasons. See id. Among other reasons given for shopping outside one's own neighborhood, 42% cited proximity to the workplace, 28% cited variety, and 20% cited
better quality of goods. See id.
167. "For New York City as a whole, recent trends-in jobs, sales and the
number of establishments-demonstrate the overall vitality of the City's retail trade
sector. These citywide data, however, mask disparities among boroughs and neighborhoods in the quantity and mix of retail services available to local residents."
INTERIM REPORT, supra note 11, at 1-3.
168. See PRIVATE REINVESTMENT, supra note 8, at 121-22.
169. See id. at 121. "Each year, thousands of businessmen fail in their enterprise,
and instinctively, these businessmen see high costs, particularly high rents, as causing
their problems. In many instances, the businessman's own lack of marketing and
business skills has caused his failure." Mildner, supra note 166, at 1.
Merchants themselves concede other factors in selling or going out of business.
Of the 1,188 neighborhood merchants surveyed by the New York City Small Retail
Business Study Commission, see FINAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 11-2, 29% of
the total neighborhood merchant sample, 31% of the renters, had leases due to
expire in 1986, 1987 or 1988. See id. at 11-9 to 11-10. Of these, 976 expected to
sell or go out of business. See id. at II-10. Merchants who did not expect to renew
their current leases were able to offer multiple reasons. See id. at 11-I1. Of those
who expected to sell or go out of business, 49% cited reasons other than or in
addition to rent or landlord refusal to renew. See id. Among the reasons cited
were "will need more space," "business is bad," and "owner retiring." Id.
170. PRIVATE REINVESTMENT, supra note 8, at 121-22. The Commission's Shopper
Survey found that about half of the respondents reported that one or more stores
they patronized in their neighborhoods had gone out of business during the past
two years. See id. However, of these businesses over three quarters indicated that
they had found replacements within their neighborhoods. See FINAL REPORT, supra
note 14, at 11-15. Undoubtedly, some neighborhood residents were forced to patronize
certain businesses that they had chosen not to use previously; nevertheless, only
13% felt that the turnover had reduced the variety of available products. See id.
at 11-16. Seventy-eight percent of the shoppers surveyed felt that the new stores
had left the variety of retail products available unchanged (44%) or improved

1987]

COMMERCIAL RENT CONTROL

such as the overall change in societal demand for a particular
service, affect the mix of goods and services in an area.", Furthermore, commercial rent regulations are geared in part toward
stabilizing the cost of goods and services by reducing the need to
pass along increased operating costs to consumers. 7 2 Notwithstanding that intention, commercial rent regulation provides no mechanism to control prices charged by businesses.' v7 In fact, in some
situations commercial rent controls would serve to drive prices of
goods and services upward.

74

(34%). See id. In fact, in New York City neighborhoods that are undergoing
revitalization and largely have provided the impetus to proponents of commercial
rent control, the variety of available services is not necessarily as great a problem
as elsewhere. See id. While 68% of the shoppers surveyed rated the variety of
goods and services available in their neighborhoods as either excellent (17%) or
pretty good (51%), "[rlesidents of low income neighborhoods were most likely to
give negative ratings." Id.
171. As the cost to replace certain goods has fallen relative to the cost to repair
them, businesses associated with the latter have dropped in number permanently.
Cf. Some Consequences of Commercial Rent Control: Testimony Before the Small
Retail Business Study Commission 5 (Jan. 31, 1986) (statement of Professor John
Kambhu, Department of Economics, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Columbia University) [hereinafter Kambhu Statement]. For example, fewer shoe repair
shops exist today than 25 years ago as a result of the shift in the economies of
replacement versus repair. Cf. id. The same phenomenon has occurred in businesses
established to repair certain electronic or electrical appliances. Cf. id. It is frequently
cheaper simply to purchase a new solid state digital watch, for example, than to
have it repaired. Cf. id. As one economist pointed out to the Small Retail Business
Study Commission,
Had these laws been in existance [sic] 20 or 30 years ago, in any
neighberhood [sic] today one would find more small shoe repair shops,
but fewer commercial day care centers, xerox copy shops, and video
rental shops. Perhaps the advocates of these proposals prefer shoe repairs
to xeroxing and videos, but it is not obvious that most of the people
in the city have the same strong preferences for shoe repair shops.
Id.
172. See PRIVATE REINVESTMENT, supra note 8, at 121.
173. A New York City planning study states:
Neighborhood concerns about rising consumer prices and their economic
toll on residents would not necessarily be addressed by commercial rent
control. Merchants with controlled rents would be free to raise prices;
many would continue to do so as other aspects of their operating costs
increased and as local purchasing power grew, increasing demand. Commercial rent control therefore, might have the effect of increasing the
profitability of some stores without lowering prices for shoppers.
Id. at 123.
174. In the current environment of non-rent controlled commercial rental property,
extreme variations exist in the size of rent increases experienced by different types
of merchants. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 11-5. For example, food-related
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Small businesses, which proponents of New York's proposed commercial rent regulation seek to protect, 75 will be adversely affected
by any such system in a number of ways. Imposing the proposed
commercial rent regulations would create an unfair advantage for
businesses already operating under a lease at the time the regulations
go into effect. In effect, the regulations would create two classes
of commercial tenants. In essence, the price of commercial space
that is not under a lease or that becomes decontrolled as a result
of vacancy will rise in response to competition for these spaces.
The net effect is that those businesses with a lease subject to commercial rent regulation are subsidized by the higher prices paid by
businesses without leases or those that have to sign a free market
76
first lease before coming under the purview of the regulation.'
Businesses signing a free market first lease will find it more difficult
to compete with established competitors nearby since they would

stores in the survey sample reported two-year rent increases of only five percent,
while merchants in the "personal services area" such as repair shops, tailors, and
cleaners experienced rent increases averaging fifty percent. See id. Imposition of
a rent control program with set rent increases would permit some merchants to
raise prices beyond the increased rental cost, since the allowable rent increase would
exceed the increased costs that normally are passed along to consumers. See Kambhu
Statement, supra note 171, at 2. Thus, while instituting commercial rent controls
would restrain pass alongs to consumers of personal services, inflation in the cost
of food would be fueled by such a program. See id. Rather than disrupting the
market with commercial rent controls, one scholar has suggested that a hands-oif
approach would produce the most favorable result. See generally Mildner, supra
note 166. Just as proprietors of photo labs and certain repair shops have shifted
to a network of drop-off and pick-up storefronts with most of the work being
performed in a less expensive part of the city, other personal service suppliers
could follow such a course. See id. Obviously, "[t]he market for cleaning and
tailoring services hasn't fallen off; people still need to maintain their clothes. Only
the economies (sic) of running such a business has changed." Id.
175. See supra notes 79, 110-11, 115 and accompanying text.
176. Statement of the New York Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the
New York City Partnership, Inc. Presented Before the Small Retail Business Study
Commission 4 (Jan. 24, 1986) (statement of Edward S. Cabot, President of the
New York City Chamber of Commerce and Industry and Executive Vice President
of the New York City Partnership, Inc.) [hereinafter Cabot Statement: Before
Business Commission]. A "free market first lease" is the initial lease that a tenant
would sign. The rent would be set at the highest amount that the landlord could
command in the market absent controls. Once this base rent is set, the regulations
for controlling commercial rents would go into effect with statutory increases being
calculated on the basis of the free market rent figure. See generally Statement of
the New York Chamber of Commerce and Industry Re: Commercial Rent Increases

and Proposed Commercial Rent Controls Before the City Council Committee on
Economic Development 2-3 (Feb. 28, 1984) (statement of Lou Venech, Vice President/City Affairs at City Hall) [hereinafter Venech Statement]..
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be locked into a higher rent and, therefore, higher costs. 177
While such regulation may still appeal to already established busi-

nesses, their support for it would undoubtedly wane if they consider
that at some point they may decide to move or expand. Not only
would they be subject to the same dilemma as the new business
signing a free market lease,' but they would also find their options
in the commercial property stock sharply limited. First, in an effort
to avoid having to sign a free market first lease, businesses will
be reluctant to move unless absolutely necessary. The low vacancy
turnover rate will curtail the number of choices available in commercial property. 79 Second, cities that embark upon such a program
will be instituting a disincentive to new commercial investment or
reinvestment. Common sense dictates that a private investor would

not build or rehabilitate commercial space in an area "under the
specter of commercial rent controls, when the same space could
be created in a free market" elsewhere' 80 or when the investor could
merely choose a totally different type of investment vehicle that

has no artificial ceiling on the return.'
Over time, the commercial rental sector will face a crisis similar
to that being experienced by the residential rental sector in New

177. See Venech Statement, supra note 176, at 3.
178. At any time when commercial premises are vacant, the proposed laws would
decontrol them until a new tenant signs a lease. See supra notes 71-146 and

accompanying text. Once the tenant signs a lease, the law would trigger the controls
on rent increases for each subsequent renewal. See id. Thus, only a sitting tenant
would enjoy the protection of the proposed laws. See id.
179. Venech Statement, supra note 176, at 2-3.
180. See id. at 2; see also Wedemeyer, supra note 6, § 8, at 7, col. 4. The
adjoining state of New Jersey poses a perennial threat to New York's growth
potential.
All five boroughs are engaged in a very tough competition with other
states and regions. A fact of that (sic) world is that commercial investors
have an alternative. It is called New Jersey and it is a very tough
competitor indeed . . . the hard fact is that if we make investments in
New York sufficiently unattractive to investors, they will look to New
Jersey.
Statement of the New York Chamber of Commerce and Industry and The New
York City Partnershipon Proposed Commercial Rent Control Legislation Presented
Before The City Council Committee on Economic Development 3 (June 27, 1985)
(statement by Edward S. Cabot, President of the New York Chamber of Commerce
and Industry and Executive Vice President of New York City Partnership, Inc.)
[hereinafter Cabot Statement: Before City Council].
181. For example, no law limits the return from an investment in mutual funds,
art, precious metals, securities, and other investment vehicles.
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York City.8 2 Landlords of residential properties are making an
exodus from the market.' s3 The warehousing of apartments for
conversion to condominiums and cooperatives and the dearth of
construction of new residential units other than luxury units characterizes the trend.1 4 Thus, the residential rent regulation experience
of New York City indicates that demand will substantially .outpace

supply in the commercial rental sector if the city were once again
to impose commercial rent controls.
During periods in which the economy is weak and the commercial
rental market is soft, commercial rent regulations would work against

182. The findings of one economist who has studied New York City's experience
with residential rent controls indicate what New York City's commercial rental
sector can expect if the legislature or City Council enacts commercial rent controls.
See Olsen, Questions and Some Answers about Rent Control-An Empirical Analysis

of New York's Experience,

RENT CONTROL:

A

POPULAR PARADOX

107, 108-10

(1975). The commentator observed that rent control is almost always proposed
initially as a solution to a housing shortage, which is characterized by rapidly rising
rents and a low vacancy rate. See id. at 108. Money that tenants would have spent
on housing in the absence of rent control is spent on other goods and services,
thereby driving up their prices. See id. at 109. Consequently, the inflation problem
is not truly solved. See id. Rent controls would also fail to solve the low vacancy
rate. See id. Statistics compiled by the economist suggest that decontrol would lead
to a higher vacancy rate. See id. For example, in 1940 when neither New York
City nor other cities in the United States had rent control ordinances, the vacancy
rate in New York City exceeded that in other cities. Id. In 1950, however, when
almost all of these cities were covered by federal rent controls, the vacancy rate
was much lower than in 1940 and about even between New York City and other
cities. See id. By 1960, almost all other cities had long since decontrolled rents,
yet New York City continued to retain its rent control ordinance. See id. at 110.
In 1960, the rental vacancy rate in New York City was less than half of that in
other cities. See id. Additional statistics also show that the vacancy rate in uncontrolled housing in New York City was generally greater than in controlled
housing. See id. Thus, "the evidence from NYC strongly suggests that rent control
exacerbates rather than solves a housing shortage." See id.
183. See Meislin, In City Housing Court, Focus Is Now More on Evictions Than
on Rents, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1986, at BI, col. 1 (number of landlords in New
York City housing court seeking to evict tenants from apartments is growing "as
owners seek to stop renting apartments and instead sell them as more lucrative
cooperatives and condominiums"); id. at BI, col. 5-6 (in 1984, number of petitions
filed in housing court by landlords trying to regain possession of their apartments
rose by 2507o over previous year in Manhattan to 6,276 and by 8% in Brooklyn
to 5,974).
184. See Schanberg, The Poverty Divide, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1985, at A25,
col. 1 (contrasting lack of low or moderate income housing with boom in construction
of luxury apartments); Gottlieb, New York Recovery: Can It Be Sustained?, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 13, 1985, § 12, at 12, col. 1 (expiration of tax-abatement law has
produced "a flurry of luxury-housing construction in Manhattan, but the advent
of widespread new housing here remains uncertain").

1987]

COMMERCIAL RENT CONTROL

the interests of businesses. Any regulation that contained a prescribed formula for determining permissible rent increases intended
as a ceiling would instead be transformed into a floor.' 5 In the
event of this anomalous situation, a landlord could refuse to take
less than the amount to which the law entitled him, regardless of
whether, in the free market, he might be able to command only
8 6
a smaller rent increase.
Obviously, commercial rent controls would not adversely affect
only New York City landlords and commercial tenants. Over time,
the regulation of commercial rents would touch most city residents.
As mentioned above, the commercial property stock would tighten
and probably shrink as new investment slowed to a rate below the
rate of abandonment of buildings. 8 7 Consequently, rent regulation
would impair the city's ability to attract new businesses and keep
established ones. The main implication of this handicap is the loss
of jobs and of tax revenue. 8
Another negative effect of regulating rents of commercial properties
would be to keep depressed areas or areas in need of revitalization
in their current state. 8 9 Lower rents, which ordinarily would encourage existing businesses to explore the possibility of moving into
these areas, would disappear if commercial rent regulations were
imposed. 90

Finally, a system of commercial rent regulation would require
enforcement mechanisms, of which the city would have to bear the
cost.' 9' The facade of neighborhood economic stability that com-

185. See Venech Statement, supra note 176, at 3; see also Wedemeyer, supra
note 6, § 8, at 7, col. 4.
186. See Venech Statement, supra note 176, at 3.
187. See id. at 2; see also supra note 165.
188. One expert stated:
Over time, control would depress assessments substantially for properties
in the most vital and economically strongest areas of [New York City],
and this would reduce tax revenues. Ultimately the weaker markets would
be forced to assume a disproportionately heavier share of the tax burden.
This burden in turn would lead to the economic stagnation of communities
which otherwise may be undergoing revitalization.
Cabot Statement: Before Business Commission, supra note 176, at 6; see also supra
note 162.
189. See Cabot Statement: Before Business Commission, supra note 176, at 5,
6.
190. See Cabot Statement: Before City Council, supra note 180, at 4 (commercial
rent regulation would seriously curtail interborough migration of businesses from
Manhattan's central business district).
191. See Mildner, supra note 166, at 5 (rent board needed to determine what
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mercial rent regulation would foster would eventually yield to the
complete havoc that it was actually wreaking on the economic health
of the city. Consumers, small businesses, and the city all would
be casualties of commercial rent regulation.
C.

Fundamental Inequities of Commercial Rent Control

The inherent unfairness of commercial rent regulation to landlords and commercial tenants negotiating a first lease speaks
strongly against it as a solution. 192 It is of the utmost importance
to recognize that commercial property owners are themselves businesspersons-they have invested their capital to make a profit, not
to provide a free benefit to other businesses and neighborhood
residents. Yet this free benefit is precisely the consequences of commercial rent regulation. 193 Under such a system, a commercial prop-

"fair" rent increase would be; an already overburdened housing court required to
adjudicate violations of law which would otherwise not arise if market were allowed
to operate freely, and City forced to subsidize new commercial buildings to redevelop
abandoned neighborhoods).
192. For a discussion on the unfairness of commercial rent control to commercial
tenants, see supra notes 175-77 and accompanying text. For a discussion on the
unfairness of commercial rent control to landlords, see infra notes 193-201 and
accompanying text.
193. Even assuming that redistributing income from the rich to the poor is a
societal goal, one commentator has argued persuasively that rent control is a very
poor redistributive device. See Johnson, Rent Control and the Distribution of
Income, 41 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEw 569, 582 (1951) [hereinafter Johnson].
First, people who wish to help low income families are frequently motivated by
the misguided notion that landlords are necessarily richer than tenants. See Olsen,
The Role of Government in the Mixed Economy: Symposium 1982, 204-05 (H.
Giersch ed. 1982) [hereinafter Role of Government]. A study cited by the commentator has demonstrated that it is not true that every tenant is poorer than his

landlord. See id. (citing Johnson, supra, at 582). Second, rent control is an
inefficient redistributive device because it subtantially distorts consumption patterns.
See id. One significant indication of the distortion in consumption patterns of
occupants of controlled housing is the divergence between the benefit to tenants
and the cost to landlords. See id. To support this point, the commentator cited
a previous collaboration in which it is estimated that the mean difference between
the market and actual rent of controlled apartments in New York City in 1965
was $395. See id. (citing Olsen & York, The Effect of Different Measures of Benefit
on Estimates of the Distributive Consequences of Government Programs, Paper
Presented at the National Bureau of Economic Research Conference on Research
in Income and Wealth, Madison, Wisconsin (May 14, 1982)). Olsen and York's
estimate of the annual unrestricted cash grant, which-if given to the family in
place of rent control-would make the family neither better nor worse off than
it was under the rent control ordinance, is $107. See id. The commentator concluded
that if rent control were the equivalent to an unrestricted cash grant program and
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erty owner loses part of his investment194 and, in effect, benefits
the commercial tenant through an indirect subsidy. 195
Moreover, commercial rent regulation would force the owner initially to assume the cost of providing a benefit to the public
without compensation. Rent control laws do not attempt to allocate
196
the cost of the benefit to the real beneficiary, society at large.
Instead, as one commentator has pointed out:
The accident of ownership of a particular location determines
the persons in the community bearing the cost of increasing the
general welfare. A further consequence of an attempt to obtain
a benefit by means of a restriction is that the full cost of the
public benefit is thereby concealed from those in our democratic
society who are given the power of deciding whether or not they
want to obtain a benefit. 97
In other words, the ultimate social cost of commercial rent regulation would be the removal of private property from productive

hence did not distort consumption patterns, there would be no difference between
the two estimates. See id. However, the cost of rent control to landlords was
almost four times its value to tenants. See id.
In elaborating on rent control as not only "an inefficient redistributive device
but also a grossly inequitable one," the commentator asserted that rent control is
flawed in a number of respects: (1) a great variance exists in the cost borne by
equally wealthy families; (2) rent control is not limited to low income families and
does not serve all such families; and (3) among families who occupy controlled
housing and are similar in many respects there is an enormous variance in benefits.

See id.
Conceding that there is no detailed evidence on the distribution of the cost of
rent control, the commentator offered some general propositions.
The majority of families at each income level do not own rental housing.
The cost of rent control is borne overwhelmingly by people who own
rental housing at the time it is adopted. Equally wealthy owners of rental
property do not bear the same cost because they hold different proportions
of their assets in this form. These propositions lead to two questions
that are in my opinion unanswerable. Why should rent control which
allegedly serves a public purpose be financed by an implicit tax on such
a small proportion of the population, and why should the magnitude of
this tax on equally wealthy people depend upon the proportion of their
assets held in the form of rental housing?

Id.
194. See
195. See
196. Cf.
350 N.E.2d

supra note 153.
Role of Government, supra note 193, at 205.
Fred F. French Inv. Co., v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 596,
381, 387, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5, 11 (1976).

197. Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis For City Planning (Making Room
For Robert Moses, William Zeckendorf, and a City Planner in the Same Community), 58 COLUM. L. REv. 650, 665 (1958) [hereinafter Dunham].
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use. The system would hide this cost by' imposing the cost on the

commercial property owner alone. 98 "When [such costs are] successfully concealed, the public is not likely to have any objection
to the 'cost-free' benefit."' 99
Notwithstanding the good intentions behind commercial rent reg-

ulations, such schemes are inimical to the interests of landlords,
business proprietors, and society as a whole. 200 Therefore, if public

officials and policymakers identify a particular community need or
if they deem that a specific class of persons requires special relief
from some burden, the government should respond accordingly.
The government, however, should respond equitably and cautiously
so as not to solve the problem of one group by arbitrarily imposing
20
the cost of the solution solely on another group. '
V.

The Small Retail Business Study Commission

The Small Retail Business Study Commission had to consider

these policy arguments and others both in favor of and against
the regulation of commercial rents in New York City. 20 2 In order

to organize its work most effectively and evaluate the relevant policy
issues, the Commission divided its task into an examination of six
strategies that the city could pursue in this area. 03 After focusing

on and assessing the six policy options, the Commission recom-

2 °4
mended the adoption of two options and rejected the other four.
The courses of action recommended by the Commission are con-

198. Cf. Fred F. French Inv. Co., 39 N.Y.2d at 597, 350 N.E.2d at 597, 350

N.E.2d at 387, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 11 (citing Dunham, supra note 197, at 665).
199. Id.
200. See supra notes 153-99 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 192-99 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
203. See infra notes 206-303 and accompanying text.
204. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 1-8. Those members of the Commission
who disagreed with the majority issued a separate dissenting report that both
criticized the majority's recommendations and its interpretation of the findings of
studies conducted by Louis Harris and Associates and other staff. See REPORT OF
THE DISSENTING COMMISSIONERS OF THE SMALL RETAL BUSINESS STUDY COMMISSION-

(June 4, 1986) [hereinafter DISSENTING REPORT).
The majority itself conceded that it is "far from uniform in its general views
on the range of circumstances in which governments ought to regulate markets."
FINAL REPORT, supra note 14, 111-2. Notwithstanding differences among majority
members over the extent of regulation favored, it unanimously agreed that "extreme

caution should be the watchword in appraising demands for regulation to favor
some businesses in their dealings with others." Id.
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structive and, on the whole, well-balanced among the interests of
landlords, commercial tenants, and city residents.2 5 Review of the
policy options and the Commission's rationale in recommending or
rejecting them is therefore worthwhile.
A.

The Commission's Recommended Options

The two policy options recommended by the Commission are:
(1) a system of mandatory negotiation, non-binding mediation, and
lease extension; and (2) a program of supply expansion.
1. Mandatory Negotiation, Non-Binding Mediation, and Lease
Extension
The Commission strongly recommends mandatory negotiation,
non-binding mediation, and lease extension.2°6 As proposed by the
Commission, 180 days prior to expiration of any retail lease, the
landlord must provide notice of his intention to renew or not to
renew and, if he intends to renew, on what terms. 207 If renewal
is offered, within thirty days the tenant must notify the landlord
of his intention to vacate, to accept the landlord's terms, or to
seek negotiation. 28 If negotiation fails after fifteen days, either
party may invoke non-binding mediation. 209 If at the end of the
prescribed period for mediation the process has yielded no agreement, the tenant is entitled to an automatic one-year lease extension
on the same terms, except that the landlord may charge up to
fifteen percent more for the one-year extension than the rent charged
in the final year under the expiring lease. 210 At the end of the

205. The Commission majority prefaced the review of the six policy options with
a brief discussion on the fundamental factors and motivations guiding its choices.
See FINAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 111-3 to 111-4. The Commission was loath to
adopt policies that interfere with the efficient operation of the market system. See
id. While it recognized that some types of regulation are necessary to protect broad
public interests of health, safety, and fair dealing, it believed that such regulations
must permit markets to function within the constraints established. See id. The
Commission sought programs and policies that would help small businesses facing
rapid rent escalation "to facilitate their adaptation without seriously undermining
the market system of commercial space allocation," id., that was precisely the
result of "regulations explicitly designed to shield certain businesses from market
forces." Id. at 1-9.

206. See id. at 111-5.
207. See id.
208. See id.
209. See id. at 111-6.

210. See id.
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year, the tenant must vacate the premises in compliance with the
agreement he was obliged to sign in order to avail himself of the
lease extension option.2 '
22
The enforcement of the plan would be a matter for the courts,
and any failure to adhere to the deadlines set by the plan would
result, in the case of a landlord violation, in a postponement of
the lease expiration,2" 3 or in the case of a tenant violation, in a
just eviction on the lease expiration date. 2 4 For the sake of simplicity, the Commission rejected a proposal to vary these requirements in accord with the length of time the tenant had been in
place, the duration of the expiring lease, and the recent inflation
rate. 215 The Commission did endorse a proposal to allow the legislature to adjust the level of rent increase permitted for the ex21 6
tension year if the inflation rate moved into double-digits.
The Commission endorsed this option on the grounds that "it
would encourage landlords and tenants to negotiate, it would leave
lease terms to the marketplace, and where negotiations failed it
would provide tenants with considerable time to search for alternative space." ' 7 Landlords who in the free market could command
a rent significantly higher than that permitted under the one-year

211. See id.
212. See id. at 111-7.
213. See id.
214. See id.
215. See id. at 111-6 to 111-7.
216. See id. at 111-7.
217. Id. While the one-year extension provides businesses with time to seek out
alternative space, a business may have to move a considerable distance to find an
affordable location. Stores that have built up goodwill in a neighborhood and rely
on their location to generate business may not be able to survive such a move.
See Carmody, supra note 5, at B1, col. 1. Proponents of stronger regulation also
argue that without regulation of commercial rents neighborhood residents may be
deprived of accessibility to essential services. The study conducted by Louis Harris
& Associates revealed that shoppers in all twelve neighborhoods sampled reported
frequent and near exclusive use of neighborhood stores for essential shopping goods.
See FINA REPORT, supra note 14, at 11-13 to 11-15. No deprivation of essential
services seems to have resulted in the existing free market. Cf. id. The fact that
residents in certain discrete areas must venture outside them for certain services
or goods does not mandate stronger citywide regulation. Rather than masking broad
disparities within the city's neighborhoods as the dissenting commissioners assert,
the Harris study points to the overall efficiency of the free market system presently
in operation. Cf. id. Therefore, strategies to correct the specific problems of
particular neighborhoods should be carefully constructed; however, citywide regulation that threatens to disrupt the market system and investment climate is not
helpful.

1987]

COMMERCIAL RENT CONTROL

automatic lease option would have an incentive to negotiate in good
faith since it would be in a landlord's interest to immediately charge
21I
approximately the market value rather than to have to wait a year.
The process would encourage the commercial tenant to negotiate in
good faith if its business is able to pay market rents.21 9 Otherwise,
it is reasonable to assume that a successful business would risk the
loss of goodwill and profits if it were forced to move to a new
location by taking the short-term advantage of the one-year lease
extension option. 220 For businesses unable to pay the market rent,
the one-yer extension would provide tenants with a fair amount of
22 1
time to search for alternative space.
Another positive aspect of this option is the "natural 'sunset'
feature.1 222 Basically, the plan's greatest impact will be felt in the

short term as existing leases expire. 223 Over time, new leases will
be for shorter terms as lease extension is taken into account.2 24 As
landlords, in their efforts to restore their bargaining power, shorten
the average lease term, tenants still will have the one-year lease
extension protection. 225 In the long term, as the economy shifts,
legislators may then make a more informed decision regarding the
226
need for further intervention in the commercial rental market.
2.

Supply Expansion

In the effort to formulate policies that will alleviate the problems
in the commercial rental sector in both the long and short term,
and to avoid merely reacting to current pressures in the commercial
rental sector, the Commission recommended a program of supply
expansion. 227 The Commission outlined changes in zoning and tax
laws that would promote the conversion of unused space to com22
mercial use and the construction of new retail space. 1

218. See id. at 111-7.

219. See generally id. at 111-7.
220. See id.; see also supra note 217.
221. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 111-7.
222. See id. at 111-8. A law that "sunsets" either expires at a fixed time or no
longer bears its intended effect. See id.
223. See id.
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. See id. at 111-8 to 111-9.
227. See id. at 111-9.
228. See infra notes 229-31, 235-37 and accompanying text.

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. XV

In the short run, 229 strategies aimed at stimulating space conversion of vacant second-story space available in many older commercial buildings could reduce pressure in the commercial rental
sector. 230 The city could overcome traditional resistance of merchants
and shoppers by enhancing the option through the combination of
second-floor space with ground-floor space, attracting shoppers and
preserving proximate accessibility of desired goods and services. 21
A mid-range approach to the need for retail space expansion
involves the disposition of retail properties that the city holds for
such reasons as tax delinquency. 23 2 Instead of adhering to the normal practice of auctioning off these in rem properties to the highest
bidder,23 3 the Department of Housing Preservation and Development
and the Department of General Services, which manage these properties, would periodically supply the city's Office of Economic Development (OED) with lists of available in rem properties containing
commercial space.2 4 The OED could then market appropriate properties to existing tenants and prospective owner-occupants who would
be willing to provide targeted goods or services in short supply in
235
a particular area.

With regard to the long-term objective of new construction, the
Commission is least specific. It does, however, urge the city to
review tax incentive programs. The Commission urges the extension
of tax incentives for commercial space construction and major renovation available under the Industrial and Commercial Incentive
Program (ICIP) to areas now excluded. 23 6 In addition, the Commission suggests that the implementation of tax incentive programs
could make new construction feasible in areas where rents are not
high enough to justify the cost of new construction, yet are in
237
need of more retail space.

The Commission's recommendations for supply expansion comprise the framework of a carefully constructed strategy. First, the

229. The Commission defined the "short run" as the next three to five years
after the issuance of its final report. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 111-9.
230. See id. at 111-9 to 111-10.
231. See id. at 111-10.
232. See id. at 111-10 to 111-11.
233. See id. at 111-11.
234. See id.
235. See id.
236. See id. at 111-10.
237. See id. at III-11 to 111-12.
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Commission opposes any efforts to convert residential spaces to
commercial use that would merely exacerbate the shortage crisis in
the residential rental sector. 238 Second, the proposal to alter the
method of disposing of in rem properties that the city possesses
meets the twin objectives of expanding the supply of available retail
space and expanding retail services in underserved, low-income
areas. 2 9 Third, the Commission is cognizant that the "use of zoning
as a tool for reinforcing the viability of neighborhood retail streets"
engenders "primarily longer term incremental benefits" and that
any zoning strategies are properly viewed as "fostering, rather than
assuring, general policy objectives. "' 240 Finally, in response to concerns expressed by dissenting Commission members, 24' the Commission notes that its recommendations are intended neither to
subordinate other neighborhood objectives nor to endorse extreme
tax concessions. 242 The Final Report merely underscores the need to
assign space expansion objectives sufficient importance in establishing planning priorities and making planning tradeoffs. 243
B.

Rejected Options

. The policy options rejected by the Commission include among
others: (1) non-intervention; (2) a system of commercial rent stabilization; (3) a right of first refusal for. sitting tenants; and (4)
a system of binding arbitration.
1. Non-Intervention
In the range of possible courses of action for the city to
pursue in this area, the Commission considered the option of the
city simply doing nothing. Recognizing that recent rates of rent
escalation in many New York City neighborhoods have resulted
in: (1) "windfall profits" to some landlords; (2) substantial hardship and insecurity to some retail tenants; and (3) disturbing retail
business turnover rates, the Commission rejected the option of nonintervention. The Commission defended its rejection of this option
because it "searched hard for mitigating policy options consonant with

238. See id. at 111-10.
239. See id. at 111-10 to 111-11.

240. See id. app. E.
241. See supra note 204.
242. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 111-12.
243. See id.
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the preservation of a market economy in commercial real estate" and
'
succeeded in identifying two such options. 44
2.

Rent Stabilization

The Commission strongly rejected any retail rent stabilization
option that would be based largely on the model of New York
City residential rent stabilization. 245 The Commission reasoned that
commercial rent stabilization, a form of price control, is justifiable
only in an emergency, which the Commission did not deem to
246
exist.
In rejecting this option, the Commission cited several reasons
why it believed that commercial rent stabilization would be detrimental to the city's interests. First, stabilization of commercial
rents would protect current tenants at the cost of depressing the
city's tax base by discouraging new investment and the entry of

entrepreneurs

247

Second, a stabilization program would directly contravene efforts
aimed at expanding the supply of commercial space by discouraging
investment in construction and rehabilitation of commercial retail
space. 248 According to the Commission, as the commercial rental
stock becomes static and market levels move increasingly away from
"stabilized" rents, voters, fearing huge rent escalations, will resist
deregulation.2 49 Even if it made economic sense to eliminate rent
stabilization, according to the Commission, "the political feasibility
'250
of repeal tends to diminish over time.
Finally, the Commission reaffirmed its commitment to allow the
25
free market to operate free of such restrictive regulation. ' Just
as the government does not generally regulate the prices charged
for goods and services provided by commercial tenants, it is inappropriate for the government to regulate the prices charged by
2 52
commercial property owners in the absence of an emergency.
Furthermore, commercial property owners deserve to be -treated in
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the same way as the suppliers and employees of commercial tenants
in that they may charge market prices for the goods and services
that they provide.
3. Right of First Refusal
The right of first refusal 253 is one of two options the Commission
rejected on general policy grounds. Although each option falls short
of government rent stabilization, the Commission believed that the
options would regulate landlord-tenant relations in such a way that
it "would profoundly change the nature of the commercial real

estate market.'

'254

The right of first refusal option is based on the notion that
current tenants should be able to remain in place as long as they
are willing to pay market rent. 2 5 The right of first refusal plan
would operate by requiring a landlord to offer renewal rental terms
to a sitting commercial tenant at a specified date prior to lease
expiration. 2 6 Within a specified time, the tenant may accept the
terms, vacate, or reject the terms and retain occupancy. 2 7 If the

tenant rejects the terms and retains occupancy, the landlord may
seek another tenant. 25 8 Once the landlord has secured a prospective
tenant, he must give the sitting tenant the opportunity to sign a
lease with the same terms as those offered to the prospective
tenant. 25 9 If the sitting tenant declines to do so, he must vacate
within a specified time or upon expiration of his lease, whichever
comes later. 26°
Notwithstanding the appeal of this option's apparent fairness, the
Commission found it to be seriously flawed. 26' Despite the plan's
theoretically "ingenious approach to discovering market rents" by
allowing a landlord to find a prospective tenant who will pay more
than the current tenant, practically speaking, the mechanism is unworkable. First, the plan would deter prospective tenants from

253. See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the
first refusal process works.
254. See FiNAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 111-12.
255. See id.
256. See id.
257. See id.

258. See id.
259. See id.
260. See id. at 111-12 to 111-13.
261. See id. at 111-13.
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negotiating with the landlord because of the inescapable time lags
that are built into the process to allow sitting tenants to consider
262
whether to meet the terms negotiated by the prospective tenant.
In addition, any difference in terms previously offered the sitting
tenant would start the first refusal process all over again. 263 With
no guarantee that negotiated terms will result in a lease for a
commercial property, prospective tenants, an essential element in
the process for determining market rents, will remove themselves
from the process rather than expend the time, money, and legal
fees connected with negotiating a lease. 264 The potential for litigation
over the infringement of sitting tenant's rights, and the resulting
difficulty of the landlord delivering the premises on time acts as
a further disincentive for prospective tenants to seek space in areas
covered by the program. 26 Essentially, the first refusal process is
flawed because it relies upon prospective tenants and landlords to
bear its cost. 266 Since prospective tenants will undoubtedly curtail
their participation, the first refusal process is not likely to produce
free market rents. 67 Furthermore, the process would frustrate efforts by a landlord to market his property most effectively because
the presence of sitting tenants would preclude space reconfiguration.

268

The Commission conceded that in certain instances landlords have
misjudged the market with the result that a business has been forced
to vacate and a store remains vacant for a substantial period,
however, it also pointed to evidence that landlords often seek to
hedge this risk by offering more favorable terms to tenants than
they could command in the open market.2 69 The Commission resolved the dispute on this point by rejecting the option on the
grounds that a market economy requires prices to evolve by trial
and error and that the first refusal process could prove more dis270
ruptive than efficient.
4. Binding Arbitration
The binding arbitration option is the second option that the Commission vigorously opposed as an endangerment to the fundamental
262.
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nature of the commercial real estate market. 27 As envisioned by
the dissenting Commission members who favored this option, it
would supplement the lease extension option. 272 This plan would
require landlords to make a renewal offer ninety to 120 days prior
to lease expiration. 273 If a tenant refused to accept these terms, he
could either: (1) vacate; or (2) seek agreement within thirty days
through mandatory negotiation and non-binding mediation to last
2 74
for specified time periods of ten and twenty days respectively.
If these exchanges failed to produce an agreement, the tenant could
opt for the one-year mandatory lease extension. 271 In cases in which
the landlord was seeking a rent increase greater than a city-designated inflation index, the tenant could elect binding arbitration.2 76
If the tenant rejected the arbitrator's decision, he would 77have to
2
vacate the premises within ninety days after the decision.
The option dictates that the arbitrator consider several factors
in setting a reasonable rent. 278 The option, however, fails to include
the consideration of rents on comparable properties that have been
279
established by free market transactions.
The Commission took issue with the binding arbitration option
as a policy whose aim is essentially rent control regardless of what
fair market values of commercial property are. 2 0 Although an arbitrator would consider a landlord's costs in setting rent, the plan
fails to give weight to changing market conditions that may greatly
influence rents in a free market system. 2 1 The virtually unfettered

271.
272.
273.
274.

See id. at 11-12.

See id. at 111-14; see also DISSENTING REPORT, supra note 204, at 63.
See FINAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 111-14.
See id.

275. See id.
276. See id.
277. See id.
278. The dissenting commissioners listed several criteria that an arbitrator would
have to consider when setting a "reasonable commercial rent": (1) the cost of
maintenance and operation of the entire building and land; (2) the amount paid
directly by the owner for taxes assessed against the property; (3) the kinds, quality,
and quantity of services furnished; (4) a reasonable return on capital, comparable
to the risk of investment, excluding amortization or interest paid or accrued; (5)
the extent to which a business contributes to the uniqueness and diversity of the
neighborhood and to the availability of goods and services in the neighborhood
and the city. See DISSENTING REPORT, supra note 204, at 65; see also FINAL REPORT,
supra note 14, at 111-14.
279. See id. at 111-14 to 111-15.
280. See id. at 111-15 to 111-16.
281. See id.at 111-16.
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discretion of arbitrators "to pursue community values at the expense
of the landlords" further dilutes any protection the plan offers to
28 2
landlords.
The option has also drawn sharp criticism because it is likely to
create inconsistency among the cases arbitrated. 283 The Commission
recognized that an arbitration system would not necessarily have
to designate all criteria when the plan is instituted provided "their
' 284
evolution is constrained by the discipline of judicial review.
Nonetheless, such a system of private arbitration would be subject
only to limited judicial review, 285 and even if this were not the
case, judicial review would merely lengthen lease renewal disputes,
impose heavy legal costs upon the parties, and leave sitting tenants
28 6
in place pending resolution of the dispute.
Finally, although advocates of this option had argued that it,
unlike a more comprehensive regulatory system, would be used only
when necessary, the Commission disagreed. 287 The Commission appropriately pointed out that almost any tenant experiencing rent
pressure would avail himself of the arbitration process with little
risk that the arbitrator would set a rent higher than that sought
288
by the landlord.
While the Commission endorsed agreements to arbitrate that are
freely negotiated by both parties, 8 9 government-imposed arbitration
systems that "explicitly omit the market touchstone ' 290 are imprudent and imperil the integrity of the market system in the com291
mercial rental sector.
C.

Other Options

In an addendum to its discussion of the six policy options in
its Final Report, the Commission briefly addressed a policy option
that it had consistently rejected throughout its work-the rent
moratorium.2 92 In addition, the Commission addressed several other
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policies that it had never discussed as a full Commission. These
other policies were: (1) prescription by the government of standard
definitions and clauses "in plain English" for use in retail leases;
(2) a requirement that every lease be officially recorded; and (3)
discretionary tax abatements for essential businesses, as well as for
to pay what
non-profit and certain voluntary organizations unable
293
rent.
market
be
to
determine
arbitrators would
1.

Rent Moratorium

Aside from the Commission's well-defined and well-stated opposition to such drastic intervention in the commercial rental market, it was particularly averse to a moratorium for fear that it
could be perpetuated for years and send the commercial rental
sector in New York City into structural rather than cyclical decline. 294 The Commission reasoned that once a moratorium was in
place, its beneficiaries would wield powerful leverage to resist its
replacement until a longer term solution more favorable to their
interests was formulated.

2.

295

Plain-English Requirements in Commercial Leases

Governments have generally adopted plain-English requirements
to protect individual consumers who may enter into contracts with
businesses without the benefit of legal advice. 296 The Commission
did not conclude that "esoteric" contract provisions were a major
problem in the issue of fair rents.2 97 Proponents of extending requirements to cover commercial leases argue that the standardization
of key definitions would facilitate the comparison of cost of rental
spaces. 298 The Commission remained largely neutral on the issue
except to point out that the objective of the proponents of the
policy is to facilitate arbitration, an option which the Commission
strongly opposed. 299 Although the Commission's caveat against promoting the plain-English requirement policy is well-advised, the Commission should approve the policy option since it would make easier
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the work of those who study the commercial rental sector and its
problems in the future.
3.

Recording of Commercial Leases

Since the Commission examined this policy option only as a
means of facilitating arbitrators' work, the Commission did not
spend time debating the merits of recording commercial leases and,
hence, offered no opinion. °°
4.

Discretionary Tax Abatements

The Commission's primary concern about discretionary tax abatements was that the policy would lead to "extreme politicization"
of the tax abatement process without the desired return of saved
businesses.3 0 Alternatively, the Commission suggested that a more
appropriate method for preserving particular types of businesses
would be to supply direct subsidies that the city could scrutinize
annually and debate as a line item appropriation in competition
with all other budget items.3 °2 As for non-profit and voluntary
organizations providing social services to areas, the Commission felt
that the city would be better advised to increase aid to them to
meet increased rents without reducing services or to urge them to
relocate to less expensive space.30 3
VI.

Conclusion

In evaluating proposals to control commercial rent increases and
ensure the accessibility of goods and services to neighborhood residents, New York City must not base its assessment on the ability
of those proposals to withstand judicial scrutiny but rather, on
economic policy considerations and principles of equity. The pitfalls
that underlie the apparent attractiveness of commercial rent regulation
as a solution to problems faced by businesses and residents in
revitalizing neighborhoods weigh against such intervention in the
commercial rental sector. To foster economic prosperity in New York
for the benefit of all groups, the city must formulate policies that
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encourage investment and innovation through changes in its zoning
and tax laws.
John J. Powers

